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Abstract
We develop a model of ﬁnancially constrained arbitrage, and use it to study the dynamics
of arbitrage capital, liquidity, and asset prices. Arbitrageurs exploit price discrepancies between
assets traded in segmented markets, and in doing so provide liquidity to investors. A collateral
constraint limits their positions as a function of capital. We show that the dynamics of arbi-
trage activity are self-correcting: following a shock that depletes arbitrage capital, proﬁtability
increases, and this allows capital to be gradually replenished. Spreads increase more and recover
faster for more volatile trades, although arbitrageurs cut their positions in these trades the least.
When arbitrage capital is more mobile across markets, liquidity in each market generally be-
comes less volatile, but the reverse may hold for aggregate liquidity because of mobility-induced
contagion.
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1 Introduction
The assumption of frictionless arbitrage is central to ﬁnance theory and all of its practical applica-
tions. It is hard to reconcile, however, with the large body of evidence on asset-market “anomalies,”
especially those concerning the price discrepancies between assets with almost identical payoﬀs. One
approach to address the anomalies has been to abandon the assumption of frictionless arbitrage
and study the constraints faced by real-world arbitrageurs, e.g., hedge funds or trading desks in
investment banks. Arbitrageurs often have limited external capital, and there is growing evidence
that this constrains their activity and ultimately aﬀects market liquidity and asset prices. These
eﬀects arise both during crises and more tranquil times, and in a variety of markets ranging from
individual stocks all the way to currencies.1
In this paper we develop a model of ﬁnancially constrained arbitrage, and use it to study
the dynamics of arbitrage capital, liquidity, and asset prices. These dynamics involve a two-way
feedback. On one hand, arbitrageurs’ capital aﬀects their investment capacity and hence asset
prices. On the other hand, because arbitrageurs trade in asset markets, asset prices determine
their trading proﬁts and losses, which in turn drive the evolution of arbitrage capital.
We show that the dynamics of arbitrage activity are self-correcting. For example, following a
shock that depletes arbitrage capital, arbitrage activity becomes more proﬁtable, and this allows
capital to be replenished and converge back towards its steady-state, pre-shock value. We also
determine how the self-correcting pattern manifests itself in the cross-section of arbitrage trades.
More volatile trades with higher margin requirements experience a larger increase in their spreads
(i.e., price discrepancies relative to frictionless arbitrage) in response to the shock, and a faster
recovery. Yet, arbitrageurs cut their positions in these trades the least. Trades with longer time to
convergence also experience a larger increase in their spreads in response to the shock.
We ﬁnally use our model to examine how the degree of mobility of arbitrage capital aﬀects
market stability. When capital is more mobile across markets, the liquidity that arbitrageurs
provide to investors in each market generally responds less to shocks. At the same time, mobility
generates contagion, as arbitrageurs cut their positions across multiple markets in response to a
shock in one market. Because of contagion, the aggregate liquidity, averaged across markets, may
respond more to shocks when arbitrage capital is more mobile.
1For example, Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Moulton, and Seasholes (2010) ﬁnd that bid-ask spreads
quoted by specialists in the New York Stock Exchange widen when specialists experience losses. Hameed, Kang, and
Viswanathan (2010) and Nagel (2012) show that the returns to a liquidity-providing strategy that exploits short-term
reversals are higher following drops in the stock market or increases in volatility, times during which specialists are
more likely to be constrained. Coval and Staﬀord (2007) show that stocks sold by distressed mutual funds, which
experience extreme outﬂows, perform abnormally well after the outﬂows occur. Jylha and Suominen (2011) ﬁnd that
outﬂows from hedge funds that perform the carry trade predict poor performance of that trade, with low interest-rate
currencies appreciating and high-interest rate ones depreciating.
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The speciﬁcs of our model are as follows. We assume a discrete-time, inﬁnite-horizon economy,
with a riskless asset and a number of “arbitrage opportunities” consisting of pairs of risky assets
with identical payoﬀs. Each risky asset is traded in a segmented market by investors who can
trade only that asset and the riskless asset. Investors receive endowment shocks that aﬀect their
valuation for the risky asset in their market. Because of these shocks, the prices of the two assets in
a pair can diﬀer. The assumption that the two assets in each pair have identical payoﬀs is meant to
capture situations where assets have closely related payoﬀs but can trade at signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
prices. Market segmentation could arise because of informational asymmetries or regulation.2
An additional set of agents, arbitrageurs, seek to exploit the price discrepancies between the
assets in each pair. In doing so, they intermediate trade across investors and provide liquidity to
them. Arbitrageurs are “special” in that they can trade across segmented markets and thus have
better opportunities than other investors. We term the price discrepancies that they seek to exploit
“arbitrage spreads” and use them as an inverse measure of liquidity: arbitrageurs provide perfect
liquidity if spreads are zero.
Arbitrageurs are constrained in their access to external capital. We derive their ﬁnancial con-
straint following the logic of market segmentation and assuming that they can walk away from
their liabilities unless these are backed by collateral. Consider an arbitrageur wishing to buy an
asset and short the other asset in its pair. The arbitrageur could borrow the cash required to buy
the asset, but the loan must be backed by collateral. Posting the asset as collateral would leave
the lender exposed to a decline in its value. The arbitrageur could post as additional collateral the
short position in the other asset, which oﬀsets declines in the value of the long position. Market
segmentation, however, prevents investors other than arbitrageurs from dealing in multiple risky
assets. Hence, the additional collateral must come from the arbitrageur’s holdings of the riskless
asset. We assume that collateral must be suﬃcient to fully protect the lender against default. The
collateral requirement limits the positions that arbitrageurs can establish as a function of their
capital. Note that positions in assets with more volatile payoﬀs require more collateral so that
lenders are protected against larger ﬂuctuations in asset value.
In the Appendix we derive the arbitrageurs’ ﬁnancial constraint as an optimal contracting
arrangement. We consider the full set of collateralized contracts that can be traded between
arbitrageurs and investors in each segmented market. We show that when asset payoﬀ distributions
from one period to the next are binomial, contracts traded in collateral equilibrium (Geanakoplos
2Examples of assets with closely related payoﬀs that can trade at signiﬁcantly diﬀerent prices include “Siamese-
twin” stocks, which are claims to identical dividend streams but trade in diﬀerent countries (e.g., Rosenthal and
Young (1990) and Dabora and Froot (1999)), “on-the-run” and “oﬀ-the-run” bonds, which have similar coupon rates
and times to maturity but were issued at diﬀerent times (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1991), Warga (1992) and
Krishnamurthy (2002)), bonds and credit-default swaps, the two legs of covered interest arbitrage strategies in the
currency market, etc. In the case of Siamese-twin stocks, for example, the investors in our model could be interpreted
as domestic-equity mutual funds, which have a regulatory mandate to invest only in domestic stocks.
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(1997, 2003)) take our assumed form.
In the absence of the ﬁnancial constraint, arbitrageurs would drive all spreads down to zero
and provide perfect liquidity to investors. Given the constraint, however, spreads may remain
positive, and the arbitrageurs’ optimal policy is to invest in the opportunities that oﬀer maximum
return per unit of collateral. Equilibrium is characterized by a cutoﬀ return per unit of collateral:
arbitrageurs invest in the opportunities above the cutoﬀ, driving their return down to the cutoﬀ, and
do not invest in the opportunities below the cutoﬀ. The cutoﬀ return represents the proﬁtability
of arbitrage activity: it is a riskless per-period return that arbitrageurs earn above and beyond
the riskless rate. Proﬁtability is inversely related to arbitrage capital. When, for example, capital
increases, arbitrageurs become less constrained and can hold larger positions. This drives down the
returns of the opportunities they invest in, hence lowering proﬁtability.
The self-correcting dynamics follow from the inverse relationship between proﬁtability and cap-
ital. Following a (unanticipated) shock that depletes capital, arbitrageurs are forced to scale down
their positions, and proﬁtability increases. Because of the higher proﬁts, the capital of arbitrageurs
gradually increases. This, in turn, causes proﬁtability to decrease, slowing down further capital
accumulation. Capital converges towards a steady-state value, identical to that before the shock.
In steady state, arbitrage remains proﬁtable enough to oﬀset the natural depletion of capital due
to arbitrageurs’ consumption.
Next, we examine how the self-correcting pattern manifests itself in the cross-section of arbitrage
opportunities. Opportunities constituted by assets with more volatile payoﬀs oﬀer higher returns
to arbitrageurs because they require more collateral. For the same reason, their returns are more
sensitive to movements in the aggregate return per unit of collateral. Therefore, they increase more
following negative shocks to capital, and recover faster. The same applies to spreads, which are
present values of future returns. At the same time, arbitrageurs cut their positions in more volatile
opportunities the least because investors’ demand functions for the corresponding assets are less
price-elastic: high volatility makes investors more reluctant to give up the insurance they receive
from arbitrageurs. Opportunities for which endowment shocks have longer duration, and hence
price discrepancies take longer to disappear, have larger spreads as well. This is because spreads
are present values of future returns and the summation includes more terms. For the same reason,
the spreads of these opportunities increase more following negative shocks to capital.
Finally, we use our framework to examine whether markets are more stable when arbitrage
capital can move more freely across them. We compare the case of integration of arbitrage markets,
where all arbitrageurs can trade all assets as in our baseline model, to that of segmentation, where
any given arbitrageur can trade only one given opportunity.
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Integration attenuates the eﬀect that shocks in one arbitrage market have on that market’s
liquidity. This is because by moving across markets, arbitrageurs bring in more investors to absorb
the shocks. At the same time, liquidity becomes aﬀected by shocks to other markets—a contagion
eﬀect. When arbitrage opportunities are symmetric in terms of their characteristics, e.g., the volatil-
ity of payoﬀs and the size and duration of endowment shocks, the contagion eﬀect is dominated,
and liquidity in each market is less volatile under integration. When opportunities are suﬃciently
asymmetric, however, the contagion eﬀect can dominate for markets in which endowment shocks,
and hence arbitrageur positions, are small. Integration exposes small markets to larger shocks from
other markets.
The eﬀect of integration on the aggregate liquidity, averaged across markets, is more compli-
cated. Indeed, while liquidity can become less volatile in individual markets, it becomes more
correlated across markets. When arbitrage opportunities are symmetric, the two eﬀects exactly
cancel out, and aggregate liquidity is equally volatile under integration and segmentation. Instead,
when opportunities are asymmetric, aggregate liquidity can be more volatile under segmentation.
This is because in markets where endowment shocks are large: (i) shocks to asset payoﬀs have larger
eﬀects on arbitrage capital holding prices constant and (ii) price changes amplify these eﬀects with
a larger multiplier. Integration eliminates this convexity because the multiplier is equalized across
markets. The result can, however, reverse, if markets with large endowment shocks are also those
where investor demand functions are less price-elastic.
Our paper belongs to a growing theoretical literature on the limits of arbitrage, and more
precisely to its strand emphasizing arbitrageurs’ ﬁnancial constraints.3 Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
are the ﬁrst to derive the two-way relationship between arbitrage capital and asset prices. Gromb
and Vayanos (2002) introduce some of our model’s building blocks: arbitrageurs intermediate trade
across segmented markets, and are subject to a collateral-based ﬁnancial constraint. They assume,
however, a ﬁnite horizon and no intermediate consumption, which rule out a steady state and the
related analysis of self-correcting dynamics. They also assume a single arbitrage opportunity, which
rules out cross-sectional eﬀects.
Our result that arbitrage opportunities with higher collateral requirements oﬀer higher returns
is related to a number of papers. In Geanakoplos (2003), Brumm, Grill, Kubler, and Schmedders
(2011), and Garleanu and Pedersen (2011), there are multiple risky assets diﬀering in their collat-
eral value, i.e., the amount that can be borrowed using the asset as collateral. Assets for which this
amount is low are cheaper and oﬀer higher expected returns. In these papers, however, there is no
explicit intermediation by arbitrageurs because all agents can trade the same assets.4 The unique
3For a survey of this literature, see Gromb and Vayanos (2010).
4Detemple and Murthy (1997) and Basak and Croitoru (2000, 2006) derive related results for more general portfolio
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ability of arbitrageurs to intermediate trade across investors is instead key to our model. In Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen (2009), collateral-constrained arbitrageurs engage in intermediation, and
invest in opportunities with highest return per unit of collateral. Since more volatile opportunities
require more collateral, they oﬀer higher returns, and their returns are more sensitive to changes in
arbitrage capital. The analysis is mostly static, however, and cannot address how arbitrage capital
and liquidity recover after shocks, or how the mobility of arbitrage capital aﬀects market stability.
Our results on self-correcting dynamics of arbitrage activity around a steady state are related
to some recent papers. In Duﬃe and Strulovici (2012) arbitrageurs can supply insurance in one
of two independent markets, and their movement across markets is hindered by a search friction.
Losses in one market deplete arbitrage capital, causing insurance premia to rise and new capital
to enter. The self-correcting dynamics in our model arise instead because the return on existing
capital increases. This eﬀect is not present in Duﬃe and Strulovici because arbitrageurs do not
reinvest the premia they earn, and hence their capital does not grow faster following losses. In He
and Krishnamurthy (2013), arbitrageurs can raise capital from other investors to invest in a risky
asset, but this capital cannot exceed a ﬁxed multiple of their internal capital. Capital recovers from
negative shocks through increased proﬁtability, as in our model. That paper focuses on the case of
a single risky asset, while we focus instead on how the dynamics of liquidity and returns manifest
themselves in the cross-section.5
Our analysis of optimal contracts in a binomial setting generalizes the no-default result of Fostel
and Geanakoplos (2013a), shown under the assumption that contracts extend over one period.6
Besides allowing for dynamic contracts, we allow a contract to serve as collateral for other contracts,
in a recursive manner. A similar recursive construction is in Gottardi and Kubler (2014).
Finally, our analysis of integration versus segmentation relates to Wagner (2011), who shows
that investors choose not to hold the same diversiﬁed portfolio because this exposes them to the
risk that they all liquidate at the same time, and to Guembel and Sussman (2015), who show that
segmentation generally raises volatility and reduces investor welfare. In our model, arbitrageurs
generally beneﬁt from being diversiﬁed, but the resulting contagion eﬀects can make aggregate
liquidity more volatile. Contagion eﬀects resulting from changes in arbitrageur capital or portfolio
constraints are also derived in, e.g., Kyle and Xiong (2001) and Pavlova and Rigobon (2008).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 derives
constraints.
5Capital recovery from negative shocks through increased proﬁtability also arises in Xiong (2001), where ar-
bitrageurs can share risk with long-term traders and noise traders, in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), where
arbitrageurs are more eﬃcient holders of productive capital, and in Kondor and Vayanos (2014), where arbitrageurs
can trade with hedgers. The ﬁrst two papers focus on the case of a single risky asset. Moreover, in all three papers
there is no explicit intermediation by arbitrageurs because all agents can trade the same assets.
6Simsek (2013) derives a general characterization of default rates in collateral equilibrium, in a static setting. For
more references on leverage and collateral equilibrium, see the survey by Fostel and Geanakoplos (2013b).
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the equilibrium and its key properties. Section 4 specializes the model to a stationary version, and
derives the steady state and the convergence dynamics. Section 5 examines how markets recover
from shocks to arbitrage capital and whether they are more stable when capital is more mobile.
Section 6 concludes, and proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Assets
There is an inﬁnite number of discrete periods indexed by t ∈ N. There is one riskless asset with
exogenous return r > 0. There is also a continuum I of inﬁnitely lived risky assets, all in zero net
supply. Risky assets come in pairs, with assets in each pair having identical payoﬀs. We denote by
−i the other asset in i’s pair. Assets i and −i pay oﬀ
di,t ≡ di + i,t (1)
in period t, where di is a positive constant, and i,t is a random variable distributed symmetrically
around zero in an interval [−i, i]. We assume di ≥ i so that asset payoﬀs are non-negative. The
variables
i,t
i
are i.i.d. across time and asset pairs. We denote by pi,t the ex-dividend price of asset
i in period t, and deﬁne the asset’s risk premium by
φi,t ≡
di
r
− pi,t, (2)
i.e., the present value of expected future payoﬀs discounted at the riskless rate r, minus the price.
The assumption that the two assets in each pair have identical payoﬀs is for simplicity. Our
intention is to capture situations where two assets or portfolios have closely related payoﬀs but
can trade at signiﬁcantly diﬀerent prices. Examples include Siamese-twin stocks, traded in diﬀer-
ent countries but with identical dividend streams, bonds with similar coupon rates and times to
maturity, e.g., on- and oﬀ-the-run, bonds and credit-default swaps, the two legs of covered interest
arbitrage strategies in the currency market, etc. The assumption that risky assets are in zero net
supply is also for simplicity: it ensures that arbitrageurs hold opposite positions in the assets in
each pair and hence are not aﬀected by shocks to asset payoﬀs. The assumption that payoﬀ dis-
tributions have bounded support facilitates the derivation of the arbitrageurs’ ﬁnancial constraint
(Section 2.3.2).
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2.2 Outside Investors
2.2.1 Market Segmentation
For the outside investors, the markets for the risky assets are segmented. Each outside investor
can invest in only two assets: the riskless asset and one speciﬁc risky asset. We refer to the outside
investors who can invest in risky asset i as i-investors. We assume that i-investors are competitive
and inﬁnitely lived, form a continuum with measure μi, consume in each period, and have negative
exponential utility. In period t, an i-investor chooses positions {yi,s}s≥t in asset i and consumption
{ci,s}s≥t+1 to maximize
−Et
[
∞∑
s=t+1
γs−t exp (−αci,s)
]
, (3)
where α is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion and γ is the subjective discount factor. The
investor is subject to a budget constraint, derived in Section 3.2. We denote the investor’s wealth
in period t by wi,t. We study optimization in period t after consumption ci,t has been chosen, which
is why we optimize over ci,s for s ≥ t+ 1. Accordingly, we deﬁne wi,t as the wealth net of ci,t. We
assume that investors i and −i are identical in terms of their measure, i.e., μi = μ−i.
We take market segmentation as given, i.e., assume that i-investors face prohibitively large
transaction costs for investing in any risky asset other than asset i. These costs could be due,
for example, to informational asymmetries or regulation. For example, each risky asset could be
traded in a diﬀerent country, and lack of information or regulatory constraints could be preventing
i-investors from investing in a country other than their own.
The assumption that i-investors cannot invest in any risky asset other than asset i can be
relaxed: key for our analysis is only that i-investors cannot invest in asset −i. For example, we
could assume that investors and risky assets are divided into two groups, with assets in each pair
split across groups, and investors able to invest only in assets in their group. The assumption that
outside investors have negative exponential utility eliminates wealth eﬀects for these investors. The
only wealth eﬀects in our model concern the arbitrageurs.
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2.2.2 Endowment Shocks
We assume that outside investors receive random endowments, which aﬀect their willingness to
hold risky assets. In period t each i-investor receives an endowment equal to
ui,t−1i,t, (4)
where ui,t−1 is known in period t − 1. We assume that ui,t is equal to zero, except maybe over a
sequence of Mi periods t ∈ {hi −Mi, .., hi − 1} when it can become equal to a constant ui. The
latter outcome occurs with arbitrarily small probability, and when it occurs we say that i-investors
experience an endowment shock of intensity ui and duration Mi. We assume that the probability
of an endowment shock is arbitrarily small so that the possibility of a shock does not aﬀect asset
i’s price before period hi −Mi.
An endowment shock in market i is accompanied by one in market −i. To ensure that the
prices of assets i and −i can diﬀer, we assume that the shocks diﬀer. We further restrict the shocks
to be opposites, i.e., ui = −u−i. This assumption, together with that of zero net supply, simpliﬁes
our analysis by ensuring that arbitrageurs’ positions in assets i and −i are opposites.
When ui,t = 0, investors i and −i are identical and so are the prices of assets i and −i. Suppose
instead that i-investors experience a shock ui > 0. Their endowment then becomes positively
correlated with the shock i,t and hence with asset i’s payoﬀ. As a consequence, asset i becomes
riskier and less attractive for i-investors. Conversely, asset −i becomes more attractive for −i-
investors, who experience a shock u−i < 0. If investors i and −i could trade with each other, then
they would oﬀset the eﬀect of the shock and the prices of assets i and −i would remain identical:
each i-investor would sell ui shares of asset i or −i to −i-investors. Because, however, trade between
investors i and −i is ruled out by market segmentation, the price of asset i decreases and of asset −i
increases. This creates a role for arbitrageurs, who can invest in all risky assets and in the riskless
asset. Arbitrageurs buy asset i from i-investors and sell asset −i to −i-investors, thus exploiting
the price discrepancy between the two assets. In doing so, they provide liquidity to investors i and
−i because they allow them to trade.
We refer to an asset pair (i,−i) as an arbitrage opportunity (employing that terminology even
when the two assets are trading at the same price). When investors i and −i experience endowment
shocks, we say that opportunity (i,−i) is active. We denote by
At ≡ {i ∈ I : ui,t > 0}
the set of active opportunities in period t and assume that this set is ﬁnite. A ﬁnite set of active
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opportunities is consistent with a continuum of opportunities each of which becomes active with an
arbitrarily small probability. For simplicity, we eliminate stochastic variation in the characteristics
of active opportunities by assuming that the set
Ct ≡ {(i, μi, ui, hi − t) : i ∈ At}
is deterministic. Thus, while arbitrageurs are uncertain as to which speciﬁc opportunities will
arise, they know what the proﬁtability of their overall portfolio will be. One setting that yields a
deterministic Ct is as follows. The universe I of risky assets is divided into N disjoint families In for
n = 1, .., N , with the assets in each family forming a continuum and having the same characteristics
(i, μi, ui,Mi). Moreover, a deterministic number of assets from each family are randomly drawn
in each period to form an active opportunity (together with the other assets in their pairs). In
Section 4, we specialize this setting to the case where one asset from each family is drawn in each
period. This yields a stationary version of our model, whereby the set Ct is not only deterministic
but also constant over time.
Under the Siamese-twin interpretation of the asset pairs, outside investors can be interpreted
as those who can trade only in one country. Such investors can be, for example, domestic-equity
mutual funds, which have a mandate to invest only in domestic stocks. The demand of these funds
is aﬀected by investor inﬂows and outﬂows, which correspond to our endowment shocks. Dabora
and Froot (1999) ﬁnd empirically that there exists a non-trivial price wedge between a stock and
its Siamese twin. Moreover, the wedge increases when the aggregate stock market in the country
where that stock is traded goes up. They argue that the best explanation for their ﬁndings is
that some investors have mandates preventing them from investing in a country other than their
own, possibly because of agency problems. This is consistent with our interpretations of market
segmentation.7
Under the bond interpretation of asset pairs, outside investors can be interpreted as those who
must hold bonds with speciﬁc coupon rates and times to maturity. Such investors can be, for
example, pension funds, and their preferences could be driven by asset-liability management or tax
considerations.
7Because i-investors cannot invest in any risky asset other than asset i, our model cannot generate the ﬁnding of
Dabora and Froot (1999) that the price wedge between a stock and its Siamese twin increases when the aggregate
stock market in the country where that stock is traded goes up. But this ﬁnding can be generated in the extension
of our model where outside investors can invest in groups of risky assets.
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2.3 Arbitrageurs
2.3.1 Specialness
Arbitrageurs can invest in all risky assets and in the riskless asset, and so have better investment
opportunities than outside investors. This assumption captures in the context of our model the
idea that arbitrageurs are more sophisticated than other investors. Arbitrageurs can be interpreted,
for example, as hedge funds since these are less subject to the informational or regulatory frictions
that cause segmentation. Because arbitrageurs can invest in all assets, they are the only agents
who can exploit price discrepancies across asset pairs and provide liquidity to outside investors. In
this sense, arbitrageurs in our model are “special.”
We assume that arbitrageurs are competitive and inﬁnitely lived, form a continuum with mea-
sure one, consume in each period, and have logarithmic utility.8 In period t, an arbitrageur chooses
positions {xi,s}i∈I,s≥t in all risky assets and consumption {cs}s≥t+1 to maximize
Et
[
∞∑
s=t+1
βs−t log (cs)
]
, (5)
where β is the subjective discount factor. The arbitrageur is subject to a budget constraint and
a ﬁnancial constraint, derived in Sections 3.3 and 2.3.2, respectively. We denote the arbitrageur’s
wealth in period t by Wt and assume that W0 > 0. Since arbitrageurs have measure one, Wt is
also their aggregate wealth. Logarithmic utility of arbitrageurs simpliﬁes our analysis because it
ensures that their consumption is a constant fraction of their wealth. We use the terms “wealth”
and “capital” interchangeably for arbitrageurs.
2.3.2 Financial Constraints
Financial constraints arise in our model because agents need to collateralize their asset positions.
Consider an agent who wants to establish a long position in a risky asset. If the agent needs to
borrow cash to buy the asset, then he must post collateral to ensure that the cash loan will be
repaid. Consider next an agent who wants to establish a short position in a risky asset. The agent
needs to borrow the asset so that he can sell it subsequently, and must post collateral to ensure that
the asset loan will be repaid. We assume that i-investors have enough wealth to collateralize any
8By ﬁxing the measure of arbitrageurs, we are ruling out entry and are focusing on changes in the wealth of
existing arbitrageurs as the driver of price dynamics. Duﬃe and Strulovici (2012) study how entry impeded by search
frictions aﬀects price dynamics. Their analysis provides a complementary perspective to ours. Note that the duration
Mi of endowment shocks can be interpreted as the time it takes for enough new arbitrageurs to enter the market for
arbitrage opportunity (i,−i) and eliminate that opportunity.
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position they may want to establish, i.e., up to μiui. Arbitrageurs, however, may be constrained
by their wealth.9
Standard asset pricing models assume that agents can establish any combination of asset po-
sitions as long as they can honor any liabilities that their positions generate. One interpretation
of this constraint is that a central clearinghouse registers all positions and prevents agents from
undertaking liabilities that they cannot honor.
If arbitrageurs in our model were subject to the standard constraint only, they would be able
to enforce the law of one price, i.e., the prices of the two assets in each pair would be identical.
Indeed, if the prices were diﬀerent, arbitrageurs could sell short the more expensive asset and use
part of the proceeds to buy an equal number of shares of the cheaper asset. Because asset payoﬀs
are identical, the liabilities from the short position would be oﬀset by the long position. Therefore,
arbitrageurs would be able to honor all their liabilities, and could earn an unlimited proﬁt by scaling
up their positions.
We assume that arbitrageurs are subject to a stronger constraint than in standard models. We
require them to honor any liabilities that their positions generate, and do so market-by-market.
The positions of arbitrageurs in market i consist of a position in asset i and a position in the
riskless asset held within that market. We require that this combined position does not generate
any liability. Thus, liability is calculated market by-market rather than by aggregating across all
markets as in standard models. This is in the spirit of market segmentation: the same informational
or regulatory frictions that prevent i-investors for investing in any risky asset other than asset i
could also be preventing arbitrageurs’ lenders in market i from accepting risky assets other than
asset i as collateral.10
To derive the ﬁnancial constraint of an arbitrageur, we denote by xi,t his position in asset i and
by zi,t the value of his combined position in market i, both in period t. The quantity zi,t is the sum
of the value xi,tpi,t of the investment in asset i plus the value of an investment in the riskless asset
held in market i. The value of the arbitrageur’s combined position in market i in period t+ 1 is
zi,t(1 + r) + xi,t [di,t+1 + pi,t+1 − (1 + r)pi,t] (6)
9Our assumption that outside investors are unconstrained does not necessarily imply that they are wealthier than
arbitrageurs because their positions could be smaller. This could be for two distinct reasons. First, the position that
arbitrageurs as a group establish in asset i is the opposite to that of i-investors. Therefore, if arbitrageurs are in
smaller measure than i-investors, then they hold a larger position per capita in asset i. Second, each arbitrageur can
trade more risky assets than each outside investor, leading to a larger aggregate position.
10Using one asset as collateral for a position in the other is known as cross-netting. One situation where cross-
netting is generally not possible is when one asset is traded over-the-counter and the other in an exchange, e.g., US
bonds are traded over the counter and US bond futures in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. For a more detailed
description of the frictions that hamper cross-netting see, for example, Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Shen, Yan,
and Zhang (2014). While our analysis rules out cross-netting, it can be generalized to allow for partial cross-netting.
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and must be positive. Indeed, if it were negative, the arbitrageur would have a liability in market
i, from which he could walk away. Requiring (6) to be positive for all possible realizations of
uncertainty in period t+ 1 yields
zi,t ≥ max
{i,t+1}i∈I
{
xi,t
(
pi,t −
di,t+1 + pi,t+1
1 + r
)}
. (7)
The right-hand side of (7) represents the maximum possible loss, in present-value terms, that the
arbitrageur can realize in market i between periods t and t + 1. This loss has to be smaller than
the value of the arbitrageur’s combined position in market i in period t. Thus, the arbitrageur
can ﬁnance a long position in asset i by borrowing cash with the asset as collateral, but must
contribute enough cash of his own to cover against the most extreme price decline. Conversely, the
arbitrageur can borrow and short-sell asset i using the cash proceeds as collateral for the loan, but
must contribute enough cash of his own to cover against the most extreme price increase.
Aggregating (7) across markets yields the ﬁnancial constraint
Wt ≥
∑
i∈I
max
{i,t+1}i∈I
{
xi,t
(
pi,t −
di,t+1 + pi,t+1
1 + r
)}
(8)
since the value of the arbitrageur’s positions summed across markets is his wealth Wt. If (8) is
satisﬁed, then the arbitrageur can allocate his total investment in the riskless asset in period t
across markets so that (7) is satisﬁed for each market. The constraint (8) requires the arbitrageur
to have enough wealth to cover his maximum possible loss in each market separately.
Our formulation of the ﬁnancial constraint assumes that the only assets that arbitrageurs can
trade with i-investors, or can use as collateral in market i, are asset i and the riskless asset.
Under a more general formulation, arbitrageurs could trade with i-investors any contracts that are
contingent on future uncertainty. These contracts could be collateralized by the riskless asset, by
asset i, or by any other contracts traded in market i. Moreover, contracts could extend over any
number of periods. In Appendix B we formulate equilibrium in our model under general contracts.
We show that without loss of generality, contracts can be assumed to be fully collateralized and
hence default-free. Moreover, when the distribution of the variables i,t that describe asset payoﬀs
is binomial, contracts can be restricted to those studied in this section: only asset i and the riskless
asset can be traded and used as collateral. This generalizes, within our setting, the no-default
result of Fostel and Geanakoplos (2013a), shown under the assumption that contracts extend over
one period. Thus, under the binomial distribution, the ﬁnancial constraint (8) can be derived from
optimal contracting.
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The ﬁnancial constraint (8) limits the arbitrageurs’ positions and their ability to provide liq-
uidity as a function of their wealth. While we derive this constraint based on collateral, we can
interpret it more broadly as a friction that arbitrageurs face in raising external capital to undertake
positive present-value investments. We can also interpret the arbitrageurs’ wealth as their internal
capital or more broadly as the external capital that they can access without frictions.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Symmetric Equilibrium
We look for competitive equilibria that are symmetric, in the sense that risk premia and agents’
positions are opposites for the two assets in each pair. Intuitively, risk premia are opposites because
assets are in zero net supply and the endowment shocks of i- and−i-investors are opposites. Because
premia are opposites, arbitrageurs ﬁnd it optimal to establish opposite positions. The positions of
i- and −i-investors are opposites (and hence markets can clear) because premia and endowment
shocks are opposites.
Deﬁnition 1. A competitive equilibrium consists of prices pi,t and positions in the risky assets yi,t
for the i-investors and xi,t for the arbitrageurs, such that positions are optimal given prices and the
markets for all risky assets clear:
μiyi,t + xi,t = 0. (9)
Deﬁnition 2. A competitive equilibrium is symmetric if for the two assets (i,−i) in each pair the
risk premia are opposites (φi,t = −φ−i,t), the positions of outside investors are opposites (yi,t =
−y−i,t), and so are the positions of arbitrageurs (xi,t = −x−i,t).
Symmetry implies that the average of the prices of the two assets in a pair is the present value
of their expected future payoﬀ discounted at the riskless rate r:
pi,t + p−i,t
2
=
di
r
.
Moreover, the risk premium of each asset is one-half of the diﬀerence between its price and the
price of the other asset:
φi,t =
pi,t − p−i,t
2
.
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Since the risk premium measures the price diﬀerence between the two assets in a pair, we refer to
its absolute value as “arbitrage spread.” The absolute value of the risk premium is also an inverse
measure of liquidity. When the risk premium is equal to zero, the two assets trade at the same price
and arbitrageurs provide perfect liquidity to outside investors. When instead the risk premium is
non-zero, liquidity is imperfect.
We look for symmetric competitive equilibria in which risk premia are deterministic. Intuitively,
since the arbitrageurs’ positions in assets i and −i are opposites, their wealthWt does not depend on
the payoﬀ di,t of the two assets. Hence, risk premia and arbitrageurs’ positions are also independent
of di,t. Since asset payoﬀs are the only source of uncertainty, risk premia are deterministic.
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In the rest of this section we study optimization by outside investors and arbitrageurs in an
equilibrium of the conjectured form, i.e., symmetric with deterministic risk premia. We then impose
market clearing and show that such an equilibrium exists.
3.2 Outside Investors’ Optimization
The budget constraint of an i-investor is
wi,t+1 = yi,t(di,t+1 + pi,t+1) + (1 + r)(wi,t − yi,tpi,t) + ui,ti,t+1 − ci,t+1. (10)
The investor holds yi,t shares of asset i in period t, and these shares are worth yi,t(di,t+1+pi,t+1) in
period t+1. The investor also holds wi,t − yi,tpi,t units of the riskless asset in period t, i.e., wealth
wi,t minus the investment yi,tpi,t in asset i. This investment is worth (1+ r)(wi,t−yi,tpi,t) in period
t + 1. Finally, the random endowment ui,ti,t+1 is added to the investor’s wealth in period t + 1,
while consumption ci,t+1 lowers wealth.
We can simplify (10) by introducing the return per share of asset i in excess of the riskless asset.
This excess return is
Ri,t+1 ≡ di,t+1 + pi,t+1 − (1 + r)pi,t
= (1 + r)φi,t − φi,t+1 + i,t+1, (11)
where the second step follows from (1) and (2). Since risk premia are deterministic, the quantity
Φi,t ≡ (1 + r)φi,t − φi,t+1 (12)
11Asset prices are also deterministic but this is only due to the simplifying assumption that payoﬀs are independent
across time.
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is also deterministic and represents the expected excess return of asset i. Using (11) and (12), we
can write (10) as
wi,t+1 = (1 + r)wi,t + yi,tΦi,t + (yi,t + ui,t)i,t+1 − ci,t+1. (13)
The investor’s wealth in period t+ 1 is uncertain as of period t because of the payoﬀ shock i,t+1.
As the third term in the right-hand side of (13) indicates, the investor’s exposure to i,t+1 is the
sum of his asset position yi,t and endowment shock ui,t.
We conjecture that the investor’s value function in period t is
Vi,t(wi,t) = − exp (−Awi,t − Fi,t) , (14)
where Fi,t is a deterministic function of i and t, and A is a constant. The value function is negative
exponential in wealth because the utility function depends on consumption in the same manner.
Proposition 1. The value function of an i-investor in period t is given by (14), where A = rα.
The investor’s optimal position in asset i is given by the ﬁrst-order condition
if
′ [(yi,t + ui,t)i] = Φi,t, (15)
where the function f(y) is deﬁned by
exp
[
αAf(y)
α+A
]
≡ E
[
exp
(
−
αAyi,t
(α+A)i
)]
. (16)
The ﬁrst-order condition (15) takes an intuitive form. The right-hand side, Φi,t, is the expected
excess return of asset i, and can be interpreted as the marginal beneﬁt of risk-taking. The investor
equates it to the marginal cost, which is the left-hand side. Since the function f(y) is convex, as
shown in Lemma 1, the marginal cost is increasing in the investor’s risk exposure yi,t+ui,t. Equat-
ing marginal beneﬁt to marginal cost yields a standard downward-sloping demand: the investor’s
position yi in asset i is increasing in the asset’s expected excess return Φi,t and is hence decreasing
in the asset’s price pi,t.
Lemma 1. The function f(y) is non-negative, symmetric around the vertical axis, and strictly
convex. It also satisﬁes limy→∞ f
′(y) = 1.
The function αAf(y)
α+A is the cumulant-generating function of −
αAyi,t
(α+A)i
. Cumulant-generating
functions are convex. Symmetry follows because i,t is distributed symmetrically around zero.
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The ﬁrst-order condition of −i-investors yields an optimal position that is the opposite to that of
i-investors. This follows from (15) and the observations that risk premia, expected excess returns,
and endowment shocks are opposites for assets i and −i, and that f ′(y) = −f ′(−y) as implied by
Lemma 1.
3.3 Arbitrageurs’ Optimization
The budget constraint of an arbitrageur is
Wt+1 =
∑
i∈I
xi,t(di,t+1 + pi,t+1) + (1 + r)
(
Wt −
∑
i∈I
xi,tpi,t
)
− ct+1. (17)
The diﬀerences with the budget constraint (10) of an i-investor are that the arbitrageur can invest
in all assets and receives no endowment. We next rewrite (17) and the ﬁnancial constraint (8) using
(11), (12), i,t = −i,t, Φi,t = −Φ−i,t, and the property that Φi,t = 0 for assets that are not part of
active opportunities. The latter property holds in equilibrium, as we show in Section 3.4.2. The
budget constraint (17) becomes
Wt+1 = (1 + r)Wt +
∑
i∈At
(xi,t − x−i,t)Φi,t +
∑
i∈I
xi,ti,t+1 − ct+1, (18)
and the ﬁnancial constraint (8) becomes
Wt ≥
∑
i∈I
|xi,t|i
1 + r
−
∑
i∈At
(xi,t − x−i,t)Φi,t
1 + r
. (19)
Investing in assets that are not part of active opportunities exposes arbitrageurs to risk that is not
compensated in terms of expected return, i.e., adds a mean-preserving spread to the right-hand
side of the budget constraint (18). Investing in those assets also tightens the ﬁnancial constraint
(19). Hence, the optimal investment is zero. Holding non-opposite positions in the two legs of an
active opportunity, i.e., xi,t + x−i,t = 0 for i ∈ At, is suboptimal for the same reasons: by setting
xi,t+x−i,t = 0 and holding xi,t−x−i,t constant, arbitrageurs can reduce their risk without aﬀecting
their expected return, and can possibly relax their ﬁnancial constraint. Hence, we can simplify the
budget constraint (18) to
Wt+1 = (1 + r)Wt + 2
∑
i∈At
xi,tΦi,t − ct+1, (20)
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and the ﬁnancial constraint (19) to
Wt ≥ 2
∑
i∈At
|xi,t|i − xi,tΦi,t
1 + r
. (21)
Eq. (20) conﬁrms that the dynamics of arbitrageur wealth are deterministic. The per-share
return of an active opportunity (i,−i) is 2Φi,t, i.e., twice the expected excess return Φi,t of asset i.
While i-investors earn Φi,t as compensation for bearing risk, arbitrageurs earn it riskfree because
they can combine a position in asset i with one in asset −i. Thus, when Φi,t = 0, arbitrageurs can
earn a riskless return that exceeds the riskless rate r.
Using (12), we can write the per-share return of active opportunity (i,−i) as
2 [rφi,t + (φi,t − φi,t+1)] .
The ﬁrst term in the square bracket represents the “carry” component of the return. This is
what arbitrageurs would earn if the risk premium φi,t remained constant over time. The second
term represents the “convergence” component. This is the additional return that arbitrageurs earn
because the risk premium converges to zero. (The risk premium becomes zero when opportunity
(i,−i) stops being active.)
Eq. (21) shows that the ﬁnancial constraint is more severe when asset payoﬀs are more volatile,
i.e., i is larger. This is because the maximum possible loss of a position is larger. Eq. (21) shows
additionally that the ﬁnancial constraint is less severe when expected excess returns are larger in
absolute value. Suppose, for example, that Φi,t > 0, in which case arbitrageurs are long asset i,
as shown in Proposition 2. Then, the larger Φi,t is, i.e., the more proﬁtable it is to invest in asset
i, the smaller is the maximum possible loss of a long position in that asset, and the less severe
is the constraint. Thus, outside ﬁnance is easier to raise when arbitrage opportunities are more
proﬁtable.
The arbitrageurs’ optimization problem reduces to choosing positions in assets i ∈ At, i.e.,
those with positive endowment shocks. Positions in the corresponding assets −i are opposites,
and positions in assets that are not part of active opportunities are zero. We solve the simpliﬁed
optimization problem under the assumption that assets i ∈ At oﬀer non-negative expected excess
returns, i.e., Φi,t ≥ 0 for all i ∈ At. This property holds in equilibrium, as we show in Section 3.4.2.
We conjecture that the value function of an arbitrageur in period t is
Vt(Wt) = B log(Wt) +Gt, (22)
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where Gt is a deterministic function of t, and B is a constant.
Proposition 2. The value function of an arbitrageur in period t is given by (22), where B = β1−β .
The arbitrageur’s optimal consumption is
ct =
1− β
β
Wt. (23)
• If all active opportunities oﬀer a zero return, i.e., Φi,t = 0 for all i ∈ At, then the arbitrageur
is indiﬀerent between any combination of positions in these opportunities.
• Otherwise, he holds non-zero positions only in opportunities with the highest return per unit
of volatility:
i ∈ argmaxj∈At
Φj,t
j
. (24)
For these opportunities, positions are long in assets i ∈ At, i.e., those with positive endowment
shocks. Moreover, the ﬁnancial constraint (21) binds.
The arbitrageurs’ optimal investment policy can be derived intuitively as follows. Substituting
the optimal consumption (23) into the budget constraint (20), we can write the latter as
Wt+1 = β
[
(1 + r)Wt + 2
∑
i∈At
xi,tΦi,t
]
. (25)
Since assets i ∈ At oﬀer non-negative expected excess returns, arbitrageurs do not beneﬁt from
selling them short. Therefore, we can write the ﬁnancial constraint (21) as
Wt ≥ 2
∑
i∈At
xi,t (i − Φi,t)
1 + r
. (26)
Maximizing Wt+1 in (25) subject to (26) and xi,t ≥ 0 is a simple linear-programming problem.
Arbitrageurs invest only in those opportunities that oﬀer the highest return Φi,t per unit of collateral
i−Φi,t. Moreover, when some opportunities oﬀer a non-zero return, arbitrageurs “max out” their
ﬁnancial constraint (26) because they can earn a riskless return that exceeds the riskless rate r.
Maximizing return per unit of collateral, Φi,t
i−Φi,t
, is equivalent to maximizing return per unit of
volatility, Φi,t
i
, and we focus on the latter from now on.
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3.4 Equilibrium
3.4.1 Arbitraging Arbitrage
Combining the arbitrageurs’ optimal investment policy with that of outside investors, and imposing
market clearing, we can derive a sharp characterization of equilibrium returns and positions. We
denote by
Tt ≡ {i ∈ At : xi,t > 0},
the set of active opportunities that arbitrageurs trade in period t, i.e., those in which they hold
non-zero positions.
Proposition 3. There exists Πt ∈ [0, 1) such that in period t:
• Arbitrageurs trade only active opportunities (i,−i) such that f ′(uii) > Πt. That is,
Tt = {i ∈ At : f
′(uii) > Πt}.
• All active opportunities traded by arbitrageurs oﬀer the same return Πt per unit of volatility,
while active opportunities (i,−i) not traded by arbitrageurs oﬀer return f ′(uii) ∈ (0,Πt] per
unit of volatility. That is,
i ∈ Tt ⇒
Φi,t
i
= Πt,
i ∈ At/Tt ⇒
Φi,t
i
= f ′(uii) ∈ (0,Πt].
Proposition 3 implies that active opportunities can be ranked according to f ′(uii). As can be
seen by setting yi,t = 0 in the outside investors’ ﬁrst-order condition (15), f
′(uii) is the return per
unit of volatility that opportunity (i,−i) would oﬀer in the absence of arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs
trade the opportunities for which f ′(uii) is above a cutoﬀ Πt ∈ (0, 1). Their activity causes
the return per unit of volatility oﬀered by these opportunities to decrease to the common cutoﬀ.
Opportunities for which f ′(uii) is below that cutoﬀ are not traded, and their return per unit of
volatility remains equal to f ′(uii).
Since the function f(y) is convex, f ′(uii) is increasing in the endowment shock ui and in the
parameter i that characterizes the volatility of asset payoﬀs. Thus, arbitrageurs are more likely to
trade opportunities with higher volatility and higher endowment shocks: these are the opportunities
oﬀering higher return per unit of volatility in the arbitrageurs’ absence.
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The equalization of returns across traded opportunities can be interpreted as “arbitraging arbi-
trage.” If a traded opportunity oﬀered lower return per unit of volatility than another opportunity,
then arbitrageurs could raise their proﬁt by redeploying their scarce capital to the latter. The
arbitraging-arbitrage result is at the basis of the cross-sectional implications and contagion eﬀects
derived in Section 5. Suppose, for example, that arbitrageurs experience losses in opportunity
(i,−i). This forces them to scale back their position in that opportunity, causing its return to
increase. Arbitraging arbitrage induces them, in turn, to redeploy capital to that opportunity and
away from others, causing the return of others to increase as well.
3.4.2 Dynamics of Arbitrage Capital
Using Proposition 3, we can determine the dynamics of arbitrageur wealth and the relationship
between wealth and Πt.
Proposition 4. Arbitrageur wealth evolves according to
Wt+1 = β
1 + r
1−Πt
Wt. (27)
• If Wt > Wc,t ≡
2
1+r
∑
i∈At
μiuii, then the ﬁnancial constraint is slack, arbitrageurs earn the
riskless rate r, all active opportunities are traded, and their return Πt per unit of volatility is
equal to zero.
• If Wt < Wc,t, then the ﬁnancial constraint binds, and arbitrageurs earn a riskless return
that exceeds the riskless rate r. The return Πt per unit of volatility oﬀered by all traded
opportunities is the unique positive solution of
2
1−Πt
1 + r
∑
i∈Tt
μi
[
uii − (f
′)−1(Πt)
]
= Wt, (28)
and decreases in Wt.
When the variables i,t have a binomial distribution, Πt is a convex function of Wt.
The ﬁnancial constraint is slack when all active opportunities oﬀer a zero return, i.e., Φi,t = 0
for all i ∈ At. This happens when arbitrageurs fully absorb the endowment shocks of outside
investors, i.e., xi,t = μiui for all i ∈ At. Setting Φi,t = 0 and xi,t = μiui in (26), we ﬁnd that Wt
must exceed the threshold Wc,t deﬁned in Proposition 4. Since all active opportunities oﬀer a zero
return, Πt = 0 and arbitrageurs earn the riskless rate r.
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When instead Wt < Wc,t, arbitrageurs cannot fully absorb the endowment shocks of outside
investors. Therefore, all active opportunities oﬀer a positive return, the return Πt per unit of
volatility oﬀered by all traded opportunities is also positive, and arbitrageurs earn a riskless return
that exceeds r. Moreover, when Wt decreases, Πt increases because arbitrageurs are less able to
absorb the endowment shocks.
Convexity of Πt means that a given drop in Wt causes a larger increase in Πt when it occurs
in a region where Wt is smaller. Clearly, this comparison holds between the constrained and the
unconstrained regions: a drop in Wt raises Πt when Wt < Wc,t, but has no eﬀect on Πt when
Wt > Wc,t. The intuition why the comparison can also hold within the constrained region is as
follows. When Wt is smaller than but close to Wc,t, all active opportunities are traded, and hence
a drop in Wt causes arbitrageurs to reduce their positions in all of them. Since the eﬀect is spread
out across many opportunities, the reduction in each position is small, and so is the increase in Πt.
When instead Wt is close to zero, arbitrageurs concentrate their investment on a small number of
opportunities, and a drop in Wt triggers a large reduction in each position. Proposition 4 conﬁrms
the convexity of Πt under the suﬃcient condition that the variables i,t that describe asset payoﬀs
have a binomial distribution.
Proposition 5. A symmetric equilibrium exists in which risk premia φi,t, outside investors’ po-
sitions yi,t, and arbitrageurs’ positions xi,t and wealth Wt are deterministic. In this equilibrium,
expected excess returns Φi,t are zero for assets that are not part of active opportunities, and are
non-negative for assets with positive endowment shocks.
4 Steady State and Convergence Dynamics
We next analyze a stationary version of our model. Stationarity allows us to characterize more fully
the dynamics of risk premia and arbitrageur wealth. We build on this characterization to derive
implications of our model in Section 5.
We assume that the universe I of risky assets can be divided into 2N disjoint families, with
the assets in each family forming a continuum and having the same characteristics (i, μi, ui,Mi).
Moreover, one asset from each family is randomly drawn in each period to form an active oppor-
tunity (together with the other asset in its pair). Under these assumptions, the set Ct describing
the characteristics of active opportunities is constant over time, and our model becomes stationary.
We show that the stationary version of our model has a deterministic steady state, and we derive
the dynamics of convergence to the steady state.
We index families by n ∈ {−N, ..,−1, 1, .., N}, with the convention that for an asset in fam-
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ily n the other asset in its pair belongs to family −n, and that families n = 1, .., N comprise
the assets with the positive endowment shocks. We denote by (n, μn, un,Mn) the characteristics
(i, μi, ui,Mi) for all assets i in family n. The set of active opportunities in period t is
A = {(n,m) : n ∈ {1, .., N},m ∈ {1, ..,Mn}}.
Opportunity (n,m) consists of one asset in family n ∈ {1, .., N} and one asset in family −n, and
remains active for m − 1 more periods. We denote the former asset by (n,m) and the latter by
(−n,m), and refer to m as the horizon of opportunity (n,m). The expected excess returns of
assets (n,m) and (−n,m) do not depend on m (Proposition 3), and neither do the arbitrageurs’
and outside investors’ positions (Eqs. (9) and (15)). We hence index these quantities by the family
subscript, n or −n, and the time subscript, t. The risk premia of the two assets depend on m, and
we index them by the additional subscript m. Since arbitrageurs’ positions do not depend on m,
we can write the set of active opportunities traded in period t as
Tt = {(n,m) : n ∈ Nt,m ∈ {1, ..,Mn}},
where we denote by Nt the subset of families in {1, .., N} whose assets are traded. We drop the
time subscript for steady-state values.
Proposition 6. The wealth Wt of arbitrageurs and the return Πt per unit of volatility oﬀered by
all traded opportunities converge over time monotonically to steady-state values W and Π.
• If β(1 + r) > 1, then Wt increases toward W = ∞ and Πt decreases toward Π = 0.
• If β(1 + r) < 1 − Π, where Π ≡ maxn=1,...,N f
′(unn) < 1, then Wt decreases toward W = 0
and Πt increases toward Π = Π.
• Otherwise, the steady-state values are given by
W = 2
1−Π
1 + r
∑
n∈N
μnMn
[
unn − (f
′)−1(Π)
]
∈ (0,Wc), (29)
Π = 1− β(1 + r) ∈ (0,Π), (30)
where Wc ≡
2
1+r
∑N
n=1 μnMnunn. If Wt < W , then Wt increases toward W and Πt decreases
toward Π. If Wt > W , then Wt decreases toward W and Πt increases toward Π.
The dynamics in Proposition 6 can be derived by specializing Proposition 4 to the stationary
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case. According to Proposition 4, the wealth of arbitrageurs increases between periods t and t+ 1
if β 1+r1−Πt > 1. Intuitively, wealth increases if the return earned by arbitrageurs is large relative to
their consumption. Arbitrageurs earn the riskless (net) return 1+r1−Πt − 1. The eﬀect of consumption
is captured by the subjective discount factor β, which is inversely related to consumption, as shown
in (23).
Using Proposition 4, we can characterize how the return 1+r1−Πt−1 earned by arbitrageurs depends
on their wealth Wt. When Wt > Wc, all active opportunities oﬀer a zero return, Πt = 0, and
arbitrageurs earn the riskless rate r. When instead Wt < Wc, Πt is positive, and arbitrageurs earn
a return that exceeds r. Decreases in Wt within that region raise Πt and hence raise arbitrageurs’
return. Arbitrageurs’ return reaches its maximum value, corresponding to the maximum value of
Πt, when Wt goes to zero. Setting yi,t = 0 in the outside investors’ ﬁrst-order condition (15),
we ﬁnd that the return per unit of volatility from an active opportunity (i,−i) in the absence of
arbitrageurs is equal to f ′(uii). Therefore, the maximum value of Πt is Π ≡ maxn=1,...,N f
′(unn).
Specializing Proposition 4 to the stationary case ensures that the function linking Πt to Wt, and
in particular the parameters Wc and Π, are constant over time.
The dynamics of wealth in the stationary case follow from the above observations. When
β(1 + r) > 1, the wealth of arbitrageurs increases over time even if Πt = 0, i.e., if all active
opportunities oﬀer a zero return. Thus, wealth becomes arbitrarily large. When instead β(1+ r) <
1−Π, the wealth of arbitrageurs decreases over time even if active opportunities oﬀer their maximum
return. Thus, wealth converges to zero.
In the intermediate case 1−Π < β(1+r) < 1, the wealth of arbitrageurs converges to an interior
steady-state value. Indeed, when wealth is large, all active opportunities oﬀer a zero return, and
wealth decreases because β(1 + r) < 1. When instead wealth is close to zero, active opportunities
oﬀer their maximum return, and wealth increases because 1 − Π < β(1 + r). Dynamics are self-
correcting: wealth decreases when it is large because arbitrageurs earn a low return, and wealth
increases when it is small because arbitrageurs earn a high return. The steady-state valueW implied
by these dynamics is smaller than Wc because the steady-state return earned by arbitrageurs must
exceed r to oﬀset consumption. An increase in the subjective discount factor raises consumption,
and hence raises the steady-state return and lowers the steady-state wealth.
We illustrate the dynamics in the stationary case with a numerical example. We assume that
periods correspond to months. We set the subjective discount factor β to 0.9
1
12 and the riskless
rate r to (1 + 2%)
1
12 − 1. The annualized values of these variables are 0.9 and 2%, respectively.
We assume that there are 2N = 6 families of risky assets: families 1, 2 and 3 comprise the assets
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with the positive endowment shocks, and families -1, -2 and -3 comprise the other assets in their
pairs. We assume that the total measure of outside investors for all assets in family n that are part
of active opportunities is equal to one. This measure is the product of the measure μn of outside
investors for any given asset in family n, times the number Mn of assets in that family that are
part of active opportunities. We impose no additional restrictions on μn and Mn. We assume that
endowment and volatility parameters are (u1, 1) = (1, 1), (u2, 2) = (2, 1) and (u3, 3) = (2, 2), and
that the random variables i,t that describe asset payoﬀs have a binomial distribution. We set the
coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion of outside investors to α = 5.
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Figure 1: Dynamics of arbitrageur wealth Wt and return Πt per unit of
volatility in the stationary case. Wealth Wt is in the x-axis. Return Πt per unit
of volatility is in the vertical axis and is expressed in monthly terms. The point (W,Π)
corresponds to the steady state. The ﬁgure is drawn for β = 0.9
1
12 , r = (1+2%)
1
12 −1,
N = 3, μnMn = 1 for all n, (u1, 1) = (1, 1), (u2, 2) = (2, 1), (u3, 3) = (2, 2), binomial
distributions for the random variables i,t, and α = 5.
Figure 1 plots the return Πt per unit of volatility as a function of arbitrageur wealth Wt. The
wealth thresholdWc above which Πt is equal to zero is
2
1+r (u11+u22+u33) ≈ 14. The maximum
value of Πt, which corresponds to zero arbitrageur wealth, is 3.3% in monthly terms. The steady-
state value of Πt is 0.7% in monthly terms, and the corresponding steady-state value of Wt is 8.8.
The implied returns per unit of collateral are 3.3%1−3.3% = 3.4% when arbitrageur wealth is zero, and
0.5%
1−0.5% = 0.7% in steady state.
Figure 1 illustrates the result of Proposition 4 that Πt is a decreasing function of Wt. When
Wt exceeds the steady-state value W , arbitrageurs earn a low return Πt and their wealth decreases
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to W , as shown by the arrows to the right of W . When instead Wt < W , arbitrageurs earn a high
return Πt and their wealth increases to W , as shown by the arrows to the left of W .
An additional result of Proposition 4 shown in Figure 1 is that Πt is a convex function of Wt. A
drop inWt has no eﬀect on Πt in the unconstrained regionWt > Wc, but raises Πt in the constrained
region Wt < Wc. Moreover, the eﬀect strengthens as Wt decreases within the constrained region.
Within that region Πt is approximately a piecewise linear function of Wt. The rightmost segment
(Wt ∈ [7.9, 14]) corresponds to the case where all active opportunities are traded, the middle
segment (Wt ∈ [3.9, 7.9]) to the case where assets in families (1,-1) are not traded, and the leftmost
segment (Wt ∈ [0, 3.9]) to the case where assets in families (2,-2) are also not traded. Arbitrageurs
stop trading assets in families (1,-1) the ﬁrst as their wealth decreases because the product unn
is the smallest for those assets and hence the corresponding arbitrage opportunities are the least
proﬁtable. As arbitrageurs concentrate their investment on a smaller number of opportunities, a
given drop in their wealth Wt has a larger eﬀect on their positions and on Πt.
5 Implications
In this section we explore the implications of our model for two related issues. First, how do
markets adjust over time following shocks to arbitrage capital? Second, are markets more stable
when arbitrage capital is more mobile across opportunities? We consider shocks relative to the
steady state of the stationary version of our model (Section 4). We focus on parameters for which
the steady state is interior, i.e., arbitrageur wealth does not converge to zero or inﬁnity.
5.1 Recovery From Shocks
To study how markets recover from shocks, we consider the following thought experiment. Suppose
that in period t arbitrageur wealth drops below its steady-state value. This could be due, for
instance, to an unanticipated shock, e.g., assets in one or several pairs failing to pay the exact
same dividend. We study both the immediate and longer-term eﬀects that the shock has on
returns, spreads, liquidity (of which spreads are an inverse measure), and positions. We focus on
opportunities that are traded in steady state; those that are not traded are not aﬀected by drops
in wealth.
Corollary 1. Suppose that arbitrageur wealth drops in period t below its steady-state value.
• The immediate eﬀect is that returns and spreads increase, liquidity decreases, and arbitrageurs
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scale down their positions, possibly to zero:
∀(n,m) ∈ T : Φn,t > Φn, φn,m,t > φn,m, 0 ≤ xn,t < xn.
• Following this immediate reaction, returns, spreads, liquidity and positions revert gradually
toward their steady state values:
∀(n,m) ∈ T : Φn,t ≥ Φn,t+1 ≥ ... ≥ Φn,t+m−1 > Φn,
φn,m,t
φn,m
≥
φn,m−1,t+1
φn,m−1
≥ ... ≥
φn,1,t+m−1
φn,1
> 1,
xn,t ≤ xn,t+1 ≤ ... ≤ xn,t+m−1 < xn.
Proposition 6 implies that the proﬁtability of arbitrage, as measured by the return Πt per unit of
volatility, increases immediately following the shock, and then decreases gradually over time toward
its steady-state value. Corollary 1 shows that the dynamics for individual arbitrage opportunities
are similar to those of Πt: an immediate movement away from steady state, followed by gradual
reversion. The reversion pattern can, however, be diﬀerent from that of Πt. Following its initial
rise, Πt decreases over time. Returns of individual arbitrage opportunities decrease over time only
for those opportunities in which arbitrageurs remain invested after their initial drop in wealth. For
an opportunity that arbitrageurs exit, the return remains constant until Πt decreases to the level
at which the opportunity becomes attractive again. From that time onward, the return decreases.
Changes in returns between one period and the next are not always a monotone function of
time. Clearly, returns change slowly when they approach their steady-state values. But they can
also change slowly when a large drop in wealth drives them far above their steady-state values.
This applies not only to opportunities that arbitrageurs exit (returns are constant), but also to
opportunities in which they remain invested. The intuition is that changes in returns are driven
by absolute rather than relative changes in wealth, and the former are small when wealth is small.
Changes in returns can hence be the most rapid in an intermediate period, i.e., can be a hump-
shaped function of time. Changes in spreads can also be hump-shaped, for the same reason. In our
numerical example, the hump shape arises following large reductions in wealth: wealth must drop
to 3 or below from its steady-state value of 8.8.
Corollary 1 traces the evolution of the return, spread and position for opportunity (n,m) during
the time when the opportunity is active, i.e., its horizon m. The steady-state value of the return
and position are constant during that time, but the steady-state value of the spread decreases
towards zero as horizon shortens. Corollary 1 adjusts for horizon by dividing the spread by its
26
time-varying steady-state value. The spread decreases over time both because it approaches its
steady-state value, as shown in Corollary 1, and because that value decreases.
We next examine how the dynamics of returns, spreads, liquidity and positions depend on the
characteristics of arbitrage opportunities. Speciﬁcally, we compare opportunities that diﬀer in their
volatility parameter n (Corollary 2) and in their horizon m (Corollary 3).
Corollary 2. Consider two arbitrage opportunities (n,m) and (n′,m), with n > n′ and (μn, un) =
(μn′ , un′), which are among the opportunities traded in steady state.
• Return and spread are larger for the more volatile opportunity, and liquidity is smaller. Im-
mediately following a drop in arbitrageur wealth in period t below the steady-state value, return
and spread increase more for the more volatile opportunity, and liquidity decreases more. Dur-
ing the recovery phase, return and spread decrease more for that opportunity, and liquidity
increases more. That is,
Φn > Φn′ , φn,m > φn′,m,
Φn,t − Φn > Φn′,t − Φn′ , φn,m,t − φn,m > φn′,m,t − φn′,m,
Φn,t+s − Φn,t+s+1 ≥ Φn′,t+s − Φn′,t+s+1,
φn,m−s,t+s − φn,m−s−1,t+s+1 ≥ φn′,m−s,t+s − φn′,m−s−1,t+s+1 ∀s = 0, ..,m − 2.
• Arbitrageurs hold a larger position in the more volatile opportunity. If arbitrageur wealth drops
in period t below the steady-state value, and the drop is not large enough for arbitrageurs to
exit any of the opportunities, their position in the less volatile opportunity is scaled down by
a larger amount. During the recovery phase, it is scaled up by a larger amount. That is,
xn > xn′ , xn − xn,t < xn′ − xn′,t,
xn,t+s+1 − xn,t+s < xn′,t+s+1 − xn′,t+s ∀s = 0, ..,m − 2.
For larger drops in wealth, arbitrageurs exit the less volatile opportunity, and possibly the
more volatile one as well.
The ﬁrst part of Corollary 2 shows that the return and spread of the more volatile opportunity
are larger and more sensitive to changes in arbitrageur wealth. If the drop in wealth in small enough
so that both opportunities remain traded, the result follows from Proposition 3, which shows that
arbitrageurs equalize return per unit of volatility for all traded opportunities. Indeed, if return is
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proportional to volatility, then it is larger for the more volatile opportunity. Since, in addition,
wealth aﬀects the proportionality coeﬃcient Πt, the return of the more volatile opportunity is more
sensitive to changes in wealth.
Suppose next that the drop in wealth is large enough for arbitrageurs to exit one of the oppor-
tunities. According to the second part of Corollary 2, this has to be the less volatile opportunity.
Hence, its return and spread remain less sensitive to changes in wealth.
The second part of Corollary 2 shows additionally that arbitrageurs hold a larger position in
the more volatile opportunity and that position is less sensitive to changes in wealth. Arbitrageurs’
position in the more volatile opportunity is larger because outside investors in that opportunity are
more eager to share risk. The position is less sensitive to changes in wealth because the stronger
risk-sharing motive by outside investors renders their demand less price-elastic. Indeed, suppose
that arbitrageurs reduce their positions equally in both opportunities following a drop in wealth.
Because outside investors in the more volatile opportunity would suﬀer more from the reduced
risk-sharing, they would value risk-sharing more in the margin. This would cause the more volatile
opportunity to oﬀer higher return per unit of volatility, and would induce arbitrageurs to re-balance
towards that opportunity.
In summary, Corollary 2 shows that following a drop in wealth, the returns and spreads of the
more volatile opportunities increase the most, and yet arbitrageurs may cut their positions in those
opportunities the least.
Corollary 3. Consider two arbitrage opportunities (n,m) and (n,m′), with m > m′, which are
among the opportunities traded in steady state. The spread is larger for the opportunity with the
longer horizon, and liquidity is smaller. Immediately following a drop in arbitrageur wealth in
period t below the steady-state value, the spread increases more for the opportunity with the longer
horizon, and liquidity decreases more. During the recovery phase, the spread decreases more slowly
for that opportunity, and liquidity increases more slowly. That is,
φn,m > φn,m′ , φn,m,t − φn,m > φn,m′,t − φn,m′ ,
φn,m−s,t+s − φn,m−s−1,t+s+1 ≤ φn,m′−s,t+s − φn,m′−s,t+s+1 ∀s = 0, ..,m
′ − 2.
Corollary 3 shows that the spread of an opportunity with longer horizon is larger and more
sensitive to changes in arbitrageur wealth. The intuition can be seen from the following relationship
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between spread and returns:
φn,m,t =
m−1∑
s=0
Φn,t+s
(1 + r)s+1
, (31)
which can be derived by solving (12) backwards with the terminal condition φn,0,t = 0. The spread
associated to an arbitrage opportunity is the present value of the opportunity’s per-period returns
discounted at the riskless rate. An opportunity with longer horizon has larger spread because the
present value includes more terms. This spread is more sensitive to changes in wealth because all
the terms depend on wealth. It decreases more slowly during the recovery phase (and, in fact,
starting from any level of wealth) because it must reach zero at the end of a longer horizon.
5.2 Mobility of Arbitrage Capital
We next examine how the degree of mobility of arbitrage capital aﬀects market stability. Are
markets more stable when arbitrageurs are better diversiﬁed across opportunities? Or does diver-
siﬁcation cause large contagion eﬀects as arbitrageurs react to negative shocks in one market by
cutting their positions across all markets? To study this issue, we compare two polar cases. Under
full integration, our maintained assumption so far, all arbitrageurs can trade all assets. Instead,
under full segmentation, the assets in each family pair (n,−n) for n = 1, .., N are traded by a
separate set of arbitrageurs, and constitute segmented arbitrage market n. Integration could be
triggered, for example, from a deregulation of international capital ﬂows.
To study the eﬀects of integration, we start from the steady state under segmentation, and lift
the segmentation restriction. Proposition 6 applied to each segmented arbitrage market implies that
arbitrageurs in market n have non-zero wealth in steady state if f ′(unn) > 1−β(1+ r). Moreover,
the return per unit of volatility is Π = 1 − β(1 + r) in the markets where arbitrageur wealth is
non-zero, and f ′(unn) ≤ Π in the markets where it is zero. Since this return is the same across
the non-zero-wealth markets, and is lower in the zero-wealth markets, lifting the segmentation
restriction has no eﬀect: arbitrageurs are indiﬀerent between staying in their market or diversifying
into other non-zero-wealth markets, and the return per unit of volatility in all markets does not
change.
Corollary 4. In steady state, integration of arbitrage markets has no eﬀect on spreads and returns.
While segmentation and integration are equivalent in steady state, they yield diﬀerent outcomes
following stochastic shocks. As in Section 5.1, we assume that shocks are unanticipated. Section
5.1 identiﬁes shocks with a decrease in arbitrageur wealth. In this section we are more explicit
29
about the mechanism through which shocks aﬀect wealth, because it diﬀers across segmentation
and integration.
We assume that shocks concern the relative payoﬀ of the assets in each pair. In particular, in
period t the payoﬀ of asset (n,m) is not identical to that of asset (−n,m), but instead exceeds it
by nηnt, where ηnt is an i.i.d. shock across n = 1, .., N . We assume that ηnt is distributed in a
small interval around zero, and hence shocks are small, so that we can linearize around the steady
state.
The eﬀect of shocks on arbitrageur wealth can be derived from the arbitrageurs’ budget con-
straint. Since markets are in steady state before the shocks occur in period t, we can use (12) to
write the budget constraint (25) as
Wt = β
⎡
⎣(1 + r)Wt−1 + 2 ∑
(n,m)∈T
xn (nηnt + (1 + r)φn,m − φn,m−1,t)
⎤
⎦ . (32)
If the shock ηnt is negative, then it reduces the wealth Wt of arbitrageurs through the term xnnηnt.
This is a direct eﬀect, holding arbitrage spreads φn,m−1,t constant. The shock has also an indirect
eﬀect, through a change in spreads: because Wt decreases, spreads increase, and this ampliﬁes the
reduction in Wt. Ampliﬁcation eﬀects have been derived in the literature on limited arbitrage (see,
e.g., Gromb and Vayanos (2010) for a survey). We examine how they diﬀer across segmentation
and integration.
We compare segmentation and integration based on the variance of spreads and of arbitrageur
wealth in period t. We also consider the aggregate spread, deﬁned as the average of individual
spreads weighted by arbitrageurs’ positions:
φt ≡
∑
n∈N
xn
M−1∑
m=1
φn,m,t.
The aggregate spread is the liquidity provided to a hypothetical outside investor who is either on
the long or on the short side of all of the arbitrageurs’ positions. Because shocks are independent
and small, the variance of a random variable Xt, e.g., spreads or wealth, is
Var(Xt) =
N∑
n=1
(
∂Xt
∂ηn,t
)2
Var(η), (33)
where the partial derivatives are evaluated at the steady state and Var(η) is the common vari-
30
ance of ηn,t for n = 1, .., N . The variance of Xt is the sum over n = 1, .., N of a variance in-
duced by each shock. We ﬁrst consider the case where arbitrage opportunities are symmetric, i.e.,
(n, μn, un,Mn) ≡ (, μ, u,M) for all n = 1, .., N .
Proposition 7. Suppose that arbitrage opportunities are symmetric. Integration of arbitrage mar-
kets:
• Lowers the variance of each spread and of each arbitrageur’s wealth.
• Does not aﬀect the variance of the arbitrageurs’ total wealth and of the aggregate spread.
Integration of arbitrage markets makes them more stable in the sense that the spread associated
to each opportunity, and hence the liquidity of the underlying assets, become less volatile. Risk-
sharing among arbitrageurs also improves because the variance of each arbitrageur’s wealth is
reduced. At the same time, integration does not aﬀect the variance of the arbitrageurs’ total
wealth and of aggregate liquidity.
The intuition why integration does not aﬀect the variance of the arbitrageurs’ total wealth is as
follows. Since the aggregate position of all arbitrageurs in an opportunity (n,m) remains the same
under integration, a negative shock ηnt causes the same drop in total wealth through the direct
eﬀect. The additional drop through the indirect eﬀect is also the same. Indeed, under segmentation,
the shock aﬀects only market n, and arbitrageur positions are cut only for the corresponding active
opportunities. Under integration, positions are cut for all active opportunities, as arbitrageurs
move across markets to equate returns per unit of volatility (Proposition 3), but each position
is cut by less. Aggregating across positions and arbitrageurs, the cut is the same in both cases
because it is triggered by the same drop in total wealth (i.e., the same direct eﬀect). The resulting
rise in the aggregate spread is also the same because the aggregate cut is the same and because
symmetry ensures that the spreads for all opportunities are equally sensitive to changes in positions.
Therefore, the indirect eﬀect is the same.
Since integration does not aﬀect the variance of the aggregate spread but causes individual
spreads to become more correlated, it also causes them to become less volatile. Intuitively, arbi-
trageurs smooth the eﬀect that a shock in any given market has on spreads because by moving
across markets they bring in more outside investors to absorb the shock. Because individual spreads
become less volatile, each arbitrageur bears less risk: this can be seen more simply in the case where
he does not diversify across markets prior to the shock. In the proof of Proposition 7 we show that
integration causes the variance of individual spreads and of each arbitrageur’s wealth to be divided
by N , the number of arbitrage markets.
We next consider the case where arbitrage opportunities are asymmetric. For simplicity we
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keep horizon symmetric, i.e., Mn ≡ M for all n = 1, .., N .
Proposition 8. Suppose that arbitrage opportunities have the same horizon parameter Mn = M ,
but diﬀer in terms of the volatility parameter n and the endowment shock un. Integration of
arbitrage markets:
• Lowers the variance of some but not necessarily all spreads.
• Lowers the variance of the arbitrageurs’ total wealth and of the aggregate spread, if oppor-
tunities have the same measure μn = μ of outside investors. Otherwise, the variance can
rise.
When arbitrage opportunities diﬀer only in terms of the volatility parameter n and the endow-
ment shock un, integration lowers the variance of the arbitrageurs’ total wealth. This is because
ampliﬁcation eﬀects exhibit a form of convexity: the indirect eﬀect multiplies the direct eﬀect, and
one is larger in those segmented markets where the other is larger. Indeed, markets in which the
direct eﬀect is large are those where un is large, because arbitrageurs hold a large position, or where
n is large, because the shock ηnt has a large impact on the payoﬀ diﬀerence nηnt. In the former
case the indirect eﬀect is large because the change in spreads multiplies a large position, and in the
latter case because spreads are more sensitive to changes in positions. Integration mitigates the
convexity because the indirect eﬀect becomes the same across markets, and approximately equal
to the average of indirect eﬀects under segmentation. This reduces the average eﬀect that shocks
have on total wealth.
When arbitrage opportunities diﬀer also in terms of the measure μn of outside investors, integra-
tion can raise the variance of the arbitrageurs’ total wealth. This happens when markets with large
n or un have small μn. Indirect eﬀects under segmentation remain large in these markets because
they are independent of μn: with few outside investors, arbitrageurs hold small positions (implying
small indirect eﬀects) but spreads are highly sensitive to changes in their positions (implying large
indirect eﬀects). On the other hand, direct eﬀects are small because positions are small. Therefore,
convexity is reversed.
Integration can raise the variance of aggregate liquidity. Indeed, the gains or losses of an outside
investor who is either on the long or on the short side of all of the arbitrageurs’ positions are opposite
to those of arbitrageurs. Therefore, they reﬂect the movements of the arbitrageurs’ total wealth.
Finally, integration can raise the variance of some individual spreads. This happens for the
opportunities with low n or un. Intuitively, direct and indirect eﬀects are small for these oppor-
tunities under segmentation, but the indirect eﬀect becomes larger under integration. Integration
cannot raise the variance of all spreads, however, consistent with Proposition 7.
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6 Conclusion
We develop a model in which arbitrageurs’ limited access to capital aﬀects the functioning of
ﬁnancial markets. Arbitrageurs in our model are uniquely able to exploit mispricings, but face
ﬁnancial constraints limiting their ability to do so. Two properties structure the equilibrium: the
equalization of return per unit of collateral across opportunities in which arbitrageurs invest, and
the self-correcting dynamics of arbitrage capital and proﬁtability. Based on these properties, we
derive—analytically—a rich set of implications for the dynamics of liquidity and returns in the
cross-section, and for the eﬀects of the mobility of arbitrage capital on market stability.
Our model focuses on riskless arbitrage: while each of the legs of an arbitrage trade is risky, the
risk cancels out. Considering unanticipated shocks, as we do in this paper, gives a preview of some
of the results that can be derived under risky arbitrage. Yet, a fuller analysis of risky arbitrage
can yield important new economic insights. Our model can be extended to accommodate arbitrage
risk: both “fundamental risk,” whereby the two assets in a pair fail to have the same payoﬀ, and
“demand risk,” whereby endowment shocks of outside investors ﬂuctuate in each period. When
both types of risk are small, an equilibrium in continuous time can be derived analytically using
perturbation methods around the solution under riskless arbitrage (Gromb and Vayanos (2015)).
Within this framework, it is possible to address questions such as how arbitrageurs manage the risk
of their portfolio, how the risk of each trade in the portfolio is aﬀected by their aggregate capital,
and how that risk is related to expected returns in the cross-section.
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APPENDIX
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: The investor’s Bellman equation is
Vi,t(wi,t) = max
ci,t+1,yi,t
Et {−γ exp(−αci,t+1) + γVi,t+1(wi,t+1)} . (A.1)
Substituting (13) and (14) into (A.1), we ﬁnd
− exp (−Awi,t − Fi,t) = max
ci,t+1,yi,t
Et {−γ exp(−αci,t+1)
−γ exp (−A [(1 + r)wi,t + yi,tΦi,t + (yi,t + ui,t)i,t+1 − ci,t+1]− Fi,t+1)} .
(A.2)
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to consumption is
α exp(−αci,t+1) = A exp (−A [(1 + r)wi,t + yi,tΦi,t + (yi,t + ui,t)i,t+1 − ci,t+1]− Fi,t+1) (A.3)
⇒ ci,t+1 =
A [(1 + r)wi,t + yi,tΦi,t + (yi,t + ui,t)i,t+1] + Fi,t+1 + log
(
α
A
)
α+A
. (A.4)
Hence, we can write the right-hand side of (A.2) as
max
yi,t
Et
{
−
γ(α+A)
α
exp (−A [(1 + r)wi,t + yi,tΦi,t + (yi,t + ui,t)i,t+1 − ci,t+1]− Fi,t+1)
}
= max
yi,t
Et
{
−
γ(α+A)
α
exp
(
−α {A [(1 + r)wi,t + yi,tΦi,t + (yi,t + ui,t)i,t+1] + Fi,t+1}+A log
(
α
A
)
α+A
)}
(A.5)
= max
yi,t
{
−
γ(α+A)
α
exp
(
−α {A [(1 + r)wi,t + yi,tΦi,t − f [(yi,t + ui,t)i]] + Fi,t+1}+A log
(
α
A
)
α+A
)}
,
(A.6)
where the ﬁrst step follows from (A.3), the second from (A.4), and the third by from (16) by setting
y ≡ (yi,t + ui,t)i. Eq. (A.6) implies that the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to yi,t is (15).
Equating (A.6) to the right-hand side of (A.2), we ﬁnd that the Bellman equation holds for all
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values of the single state variable wi,t if
A =
αA(1 + r)
α+A
, (A.7)
Fi,t = − log
(
γ(α+A)
α
)
+
α {A [yi,tΦi,t − f [(yi,t + ui,t)i]] + Fi,t+1} −A log
(
α
A
)
α+A
. (A.8)
Eq. (A.7) implies that A = rα. Substituting into (A.8), we ﬁnd
Fi,t = − log[γ(1 + r)] +
rα [yi,tΦi,t − f [(yi,t + ui,t)i]] + Fi,t+1 + r log(r)
1 + r
. (A.9)
Eq. (A.9) and the transversality condition lims→∞
Fi,t+s
(1+r)s = 0 determine Fi,t.
Proof of Lemma 1: To prove the properties in the lemma, we set αˆ ≡ αA
α+A and ˆi,t ≡
i,t
i
. Since
the distribution of ˆi,t is independent of i and t, so is the function f(y). Since ˆi,t has mean zero,
Jensen’s inequality implies that
E [exp (−αˆyˆi,t)] ≥ exp(0) = 1,
and hence f(y) ≥ 0. Since ˆi,t is distributed symmetrically around zero,
E [exp (−αˆyˆi,t)] = E [exp (αˆyˆi,t)] ,
and hence f(y) is symmetric around the vertical axis. To show that f(y) is strictly convex, we
show that f ′′(y) > 0. Since
f(y) =
log {E [exp (−αˆyˆi,t)]}
αˆ
,
diﬀerentiating once we ﬁnd
f ′(y) = −
E [ˆi,t exp (−αˆyˆi,t)]
E [exp (−αˆyˆi,t)]
, (A.10)
and diﬀerentiating twice we ﬁnd
f ′′(y) = αˆ
E
[
ˆ2i,t exp (−αˆyˆi,t)
]
E [exp (−αˆyˆi,t)]− {E [ˆi,t exp (−αˆyˆi,t)]}
2
{E [exp (−αˆyˆi,t)]}
2 . (A.11)
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The numerator in (A.11) is positive because of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality [E(XY )]2 ≤ E(X2)E(Y 2),
which is strict when the random variables X and Y are not proportional. We can use the Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality by setting
X ≡ ˆi,t exp
(
−
αˆyˆi,t
2
)
,
Y ≡ exp
(
−
αˆyˆi,t
2
)
,
and noting that X and Y are not proportional because ˆi,t is stochastic. Therefore, f
′′(y) > 0. To
show that limy→∞ f
′(y) = 1, we show that |f ′(y)−1| can be made smaller than 2η for any arbitrary
η > 0 when y goes to inﬁnity. Using (A.10) and the fact that ˆi,t is distributed symmetrically around
zero with the supremum of its support being one, we ﬁnd
|f ′(y)− 1| =
E [(1 + ˆi,t) exp (−αˆyˆi,t)]
E [exp (−αˆyˆi,t)]
=
E
[
(1 + ˆi,t) exp (−αˆyˆi,t) 1{ˆi,t∈[−1,−1+η]}
]
E [exp (−αˆyˆi,t)]
+
E
[
(1 + ˆi,t) exp (−αˆyˆi,t)1{ˆi,t∈(−1+η,1]}
]
E [exp (−αˆyˆi,t)]
.
(A.12)
Since
(1 + ˆi,t)1{ˆi,t∈[−1,−1+η]} ≤ η,
the ﬁrst term in the right-hand side of (A.12) is smaller than η. The second term can also be made
smaller than η for large y. Indeed, multiplying numerator and denominator by exp (−αˆy(1− η)),
we can write this term as
E
[
(1 + ˆi,t) exp (−αˆy(ˆi,t + 1− η)) 1{ˆi,t∈(−1+η,1]}
]
E [exp (−αˆy(ˆi,t + 1− η))]
. (A.13)
Since ˆi,t in the numerator of (A.13) exceeds −1 + η, the numerator remains bounded when y goes
to inﬁnity. The denominator of (A.13) converges to inﬁnity, however, because i,t takes values in
[−1,−1 + η) with positive probability.
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Proof of Proposition 2: The arbitrageur’s Bellman equation is
Vt(Wt) = max
ct+1,{xi,t}i∈At
{β log(ci,t+1) + βVt+1(Wt+1)} . (A.14)
Substituting (20) and (22) into (A.14), we ﬁnd
B log(Wt)+Gt = max
ct+1,{xi,t}i∈At
{
β log(ci,t+1) + βB log
(
(1 + r)Wt + 2
∑
i∈At
xi,tΦi,t − ct+1
)
+ βGt+1
}
.
(A.15)
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to consumption is
1
ci,t+1
−
B
(1 + r)Wt + 2
∑
i∈At
xi,tΦi,t − ct+1
= 0
⇒ ci,t+1 =
(1 + r)Wt + 2
∑
i∈At
xi,tΦi,t − ct+1
B
=
Wt+1
B
(A.16)
⇒ ci,t+1 =
(1 + r)Wt + 2
∑
i∈At xi,tΦi,t
B + 1
, (A.17)
where the second equality in (A.16) follows from (20). Using (A.17), we can write the right-hand
side of (A.15) as
max
{xi,t}i∈At
{
β(B + 1) log
(
(1 + r)Wt + 2
∑
i∈At
xi,tΦi,t
)
+ βB log(B)− β(B + 1) log(B + 1) + βGt+1
}
.
(A.18)
The maximization in (A.18) is subject to the ﬁnancial constraint (21). Expected excess returns are
assumed to satisfy Φi,t ≥ 0 for all i ∈ At. Moreover, (15) and Lemma 1 imply that Φi,t < i for all
i ∈ At.
When Φi,t = 0 for all i ∈ At, the arbitrageur is indiﬀerent between any combination of positions
in the active opportunities. When Φi,t > 0 for some i ∈ At, (21) binds, and this implies that
xi,t ≥ 0 for all i ∈ At. Indeed, if xi,t < 0 for some i ∈ At, then setting those xi,t to zero would
relax (21). Hence, (A.18) could be raised by increasing those xi,t for which Φi,t > 0. Since xi,t ≥ 0
for all i ∈ At, (21) becomes (26). Maximizing (A.18) subject to (26) and xi,t ≥ 0, we ﬁnd that the
arbitrageur holds non-zero positions only in opportunities i ∈ Mt ≡ argmaxj∈At
Φj,t
j
.
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Setting
Πt ≡ max
j∈At
Φj,t
j
∈ [0, 1)
and using the characterization of the arbitrageur’s optimal positions, we ﬁnd
(1 + r)Wt + 2
∑
i∈At
xi,tΦi,t =
1 + r
1−Πt
Wt. (A.19)
When Πt = 0, (A.19) follows because Φi,t = 0 for all i ∈ At. When Πt > 0, (A.19) follows by
writing the left-hand side as
(1 + r)Wt + 2
∑
i∈Mt
xi,tΦi,t = (1 + r)Wt + 2Πt
∑
i∈Mt
xi,ti,
and combining with (26), which binds and can be written as
Wt = 2
∑
i∈Mt
xi,t (i − Φi,t)
1 + r
= 2(1−Πt)
∑
i∈Mt
xi,ti
1 + r
.
Substituting (A.19) into (A.18), and equating (A.18) to the right-hand side of (A.15), we ﬁnd that
the Bellman equation holds for all values of the single state variable Wt if
B = β(B + 1), (A.20)
Gt = β(B + 1) log
(
(1 + r)Πt
1−Πt
)
+ βB log(B)− β(B + 1) log(B + 1) + βGt+1. (A.21)
Eq. (A.7) implies that B = β1−β . Substituting into (A.16), we ﬁnd (23). Eq. (A.21) and the
transversality condition lims→∞ β
sGt+s = 0 determine Gt.
Proof of Proposition 3: We deﬁne Πt as in the proof of Proposition 2. Proposition 2 implies that
if arbitrageurs trade opportunity (i,−i) then
Φi,t
i
= Πt, and if they do not trade it then
Φi,t
i
≤ Πt.
In the former case, xi,t > 0 and (9) imply that yi,t < 0. Substituting into (15) and using the
convexity of f(y), we ﬁnd f ′(uii) >
Φi,t
i
= Πt. In the latter case, xi,t = 0 and (9) imply that
yi,t = 0. Substituting into (15), we ﬁnd f
′(uii) =
Φi,t
i
≤ Πt.
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Proof of Proposition 4: Substituting ct+1 from (23) into (20), and solving for Wt+1, we ﬁnd
(25). Combining with (A.19) yields (27).
If Πt = 0, then Proposition 3 implies that all active opportunities are traded, and (A.19) implies
that arbitrageurs earn the riskless rate r. To determine a lower bound onWt, we use market clearing
and the ﬁnancial constraint. Eq. (15) implies that f ′[(yi,t + ui)i] =
Φi,t
i
= 0 for all i ∈ At. Since
f(y) is symmetric around the vertical axis (Lemma 1), f ′(0) = 0. Strict convexity of f(y) implies
that f ′(y) is invertible and hence yi,t+ui = 0. Combining with (9), we ﬁnd xi,t = μiui. Substituting
xi,t = μiui into (26) and using Φi,t = 0 for all i ∈ At, we ﬁnd Wt ≥ Wc,t.
If Πt > 0, then Proposition 2 implies that the ﬁnancial constraint binds, and (A.19) implies
that arbitrageurs earn the riskless return 1+r1+Πt − 1 > r. To determine how Πt relates to Wt, we use
market clearing and the ﬁnancial constraint. Eq. (15) and Proposition 3 imply that f ′[(yi,t+ui)i] =
Φi,t
i
= Πt for all i ∈ Tt. Inverting this equation yields
(yi,t + ui)i = (f
′)−1(Πt)
⇒ xi,t = μiui − μi
(f ′)−1(Πt)
i
, (A.22)
where the second step follows from (9). Since xi,t = 0 for all i ∈ At/Tt, we can write (26) (which
binds) as
Wt = 2
∑
i∈Tt
xi,t (i − Φi,t)
1 + r
(A.23)
= 2(1−Πt)
∑
i∈Tt
xi,ti
1 + r
, (A.24)
where the second step follows from Proposition 3. Since 0 < xi,t < μiui,t for all i ∈ Tt (because
of (A.22)) and Πt ∈ (0, 1), (A.23) implies that Wt < Wc,t . Substituting xi,t from (A.22) into
(A.24), we ﬁnd (28). The left-hand side of (28) decreases in Πt because f
′′(y) > 0 implies that
f ′(y) is increasing. Moreover, it is equal to zero for Πt = maxi∈At f
′(uii) and to Wc,t for Πt = 0.
Therefore, (28) has a unique positive solution for Wt ∈ (0,Wc,t), which decreases in Wt.
To show convexity of Πt, we diﬀerentiate (28) implicitly with respect to Wt. We ﬁnd
dΠt
dWt
= −
1
2
1+r
∑
i∈Tt
μi
[
uii − (f ′)−1(Πt) +
1−Πt
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Πt)]
] . (A.25)
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The derivative dΠt
dWt
is continuous, except at Wt = Wc,t and at the points where the set Tt changes.
For those values of Wt, the left derivative is smaller than the right derivative. For Wt = Wc,t,
this is because the left derivative is negative and the right derivative is zero. For a point where Tt
changes, this is because the denominator for the right derivative minus that for the left derivative
is
2
1 + r
∑
i∈DT t
μi
[
uii − (f
′)−1(Πt) +
1−Πt
f ′′ [(f ′)−1(Πt)]
]
=
2
1 + r
∑
i∈DT t
μi
[
1−Πt
f ′′ [(f ′)−1(Πt)]
]
> 0,
where DT t denotes the additional opportunities that become traded to the right of that point.
Therefore, Πt is convex if the function
uii − (f
′)−1(Πt) +
1−Πt
f ′′ [(f ′)−1(Πt)]
is increasing in Wt, or equivalently is decreasing in Πt. This is also equivalent to the function
G(y) ≡ −y +
1− f ′(y)
f ′′(y)
being decreasing in y because f ′(y) is increasing. The derivative of G(y) with respect to y has the
same sign as the function
G1(y) ≡ −2f
′′(y)2 − f ′′′(y)
(
1− f ′(y)
)
.
Diﬀerentiating (A.11) we ﬁnd
f ′′′(y) = αˆ2
⎡
⎣2E [ˆi,t exp (−αˆyˆi,t)] E
[
ˆ2i,t exp (−αˆyˆi,t)
]
E [exp (−αˆyˆi,t)]− {E [ˆi,t exp (−αˆyˆi,t)]}
2
{E [exp (−αˆyˆi,t)]}
3
+
E
[
ˆ2i,t exp (−αˆyˆi,t)
]
E [ˆi,t exp (−αˆyˆi,t)]− E
[
ˆ3i,t exp (−αˆyˆi,t)
]
E [exp (−αˆyˆi,t)]
{E [exp (−αˆyˆi,t)]}
2
⎤
⎦ .
(A.26)
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Using (A.10), (A.11) and (A.26), we ﬁnd
G1(y) = −αˆ
2
[
2
(
E
[
ˆ2i,t exp (−αˆyˆi,t)
]
E [exp (−αˆyˆi,t)] + E [ˆi,t exp (−αˆyˆi,t)]
)
×
E
[
ˆ2i,t exp (−αˆyˆi,t)
]
E [exp (−αˆyˆi,t)]− {E [ˆi,t exp (−αˆyˆi,t)]}
2
{E [exp (−αˆyˆi,t)]}
4
+ E [(1 + ˆi,t) exp (−αˆyˆi,t)]
×
E
[
ˆ2i,t exp (−αˆyˆi,t)
]
E [ˆi,t exp (−αˆyˆi,t)]− E
[
ˆ3i,t exp (−αˆyˆi,t)
]
E [exp (−αˆyˆi,t)]
{E [exp (−αˆyˆi,t)]}
3
⎤
⎦ .
When the distribution of i,t is binomial, ˆi,t has also a binomial distribution that takes the values
1 and -1 with equal probabilities. Therefore,
E [exp (−αˆyˆi,t)] = E
[
ˆ2i,t exp (−αˆyˆi,t)
]
= cosh(αˆy),
E [ˆi,t exp (−αˆyˆi,t)] = E
[
ˆ3i,t exp (−αˆyˆi,t)
]
= − sinh(αˆy),
and the function G1(y) becomes
G1(y) = −αˆ
2 2
(
cosh2(αˆy)− sinh(αˆy)
)
cosh4(αˆy)
.
Since cosh(x) ≥ 1 and cosh(x) > sinh(x), G1(y) is negative and hence G(y) is decreasing.
Proof of Proposition 5: Suppose that in equilibrium (i) expected excess returns Φi,t for assets
i ∈ At are given by Propositions 3 and 4, (ii) risk premia φi,t for assets i ∈ At are given by solving
(12) backwards with the terminal condition φi,hi = 0:
φi,t =
hi−t−1∑
s=0
Φi,t+s
(1 + r)s+1
, (A.27)
(iii) expected excess returns and risk premia for assets −i, i ∈ At, are opposites to those for assets i,
and (iv) expected excess returns and risk premia for assets that are not part of active opportunities
are zero. The optimization problems of investors and arbitrageurs are then as in Sections 3.2 and
3.3. The analysis in these sections and in Section 3.4 ensures that the markets for all assets clear
and that the quantities (φi,t, yi,t, xi,t,Wt) have the properties in the proposition.
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Proof of Proposition 6: The dynamics of Wt in the three cases of the proposition are as follows:
• If β(1 + r) > 1, then (27) implies that Wt increases to W = ∞.
• If β(1+ r) < 1−Π, then (27) implies that Wt decreases to W = 0 because Π is the maximum
value of Πt.
• If 1−Π < β(1 + r) < 1, then (27) implies that Wt remains constant when Πt is equal to the
steady-state value Π given by (30). The steady-state value W of Wt is given by (29) because
of (28). When Wt < W , (27) implies that Wt+1 > Wt because Πt > Π. Conversely, when
Wt > W , (27) implies that Wt+1 < Wt because Πt < Π. To show that convergence of Wt to
W is monotone, we need to show that Wt+1 < W in the former case and Wt+1 > W in the
latter case. Since (27) implies that
Wt+1 −W = β(1 + r)
(
Wt
1−Πt
−
W
1−Π
)
,
convergence is monotone if the function F (Wt) =
Wt
1−Πt
is increasing inWt, where Πt is deﬁned
implicitly as function of Wt from Proposition 4. When Wt > Wc, F (Wt) is increasing in Wt
because Πt = 0. When Wt < Wc, (28) implies that
F (Wt) =
2
1 + r
∑
i∈Tt
μi
[
uii − (f
′)−1(Πt)
]
.
Since f(y) is strictly convex and Πt decreases in Wt, F (Wt) is increasing in Wt. Since Π > 0,
Proposition 4 implies that W ∈ (0,Wc).
The dynamics of Πt in each of the three cases follow from the dynamics of Wt, and from the
dependence of Πt on Wt derived in Proposition 4.
Proof of Corollary 1: We ﬁrst show the properties of returns. Since arbitrageurs’ return per unit
of volatility is decreasing in their wealth within the constrained region (Proposition 4), it increases
to a value Πt > Π when wealth drops to Wt < W . It then decreases over time and converges
back to Π (Proposition 6). Proposition 3 implies that an opportunity (n,m) traded in steady
state satisﬁes Φn = nΠ and f
′(unn) > Π. If arbitrageurs remain invested in this opportunity
after their initial drop in wealth, then Φn,t = nΠt > nΠ. If they exit the opportunity, then
Φn,t = nf
′(unn) > nΠ. In both cases, Φn,t > Φn. If the opportunity is traded in a period
t+ s for s = 0, ..,m − 2, then it is traded in all periods until t+m− 1 because Πt decreases over
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time. Moreover, Φn,t+s = nΠt+s > nΠt+s+1 = Φn,t+s+1 > nΠ. If the opportunity is not traded in
period t+s but is traded in period t+s+1, then Φn,t+s = nf
′(unn) > nΠt+s+1 = Φn,t+s+1 > nΠ.
If the opportunity is not traded in both periods, then Φn,t+s = nf
′(unn) = Φn,t+s+1 > nΠ. In
all three cases, Φn,t+s ≥ Φn,t+s+1 > Φn.
We next show the properties of spreads. Using (31), its steady-state version
φn,m =
m−1∑
s=0
Φn
(1 + r)s+1
, (A.28)
and Φn,t+s > Φn for s = 0, ..,m − 1, we ﬁnd φn,m,t > φn,m. Using (31) written for (m − s, t + s)
and (m− s− 1, t+ s+1) instead of (m, t), (A.28), and Φn,t+s ≥ Φn,t+s′ for s
′ = s+1, ..,m− 1, we
ﬁnd
φn,m−s,t+s
φn,m−s
≥
φn,m−s−1,t+s+1
φn,m−s−1
for s = 0, ..,m − 2.
The properties of positions follow from those of returns by using (9), (15) and the fact that
f ′(y) is increasing.
Proof of Corollary 2: We ﬁrst show the properties of returns. Since opportunities (n,m) and
(n′,m) are traded in steady state, Φn = nΠ > n′Π = Φn′ . If arbitrageurs remain invested in both
opportunities after their initial drop in wealth, then
Φn,t − Φn = n(Πt −Π) > n′(Πt −Π) = Φn′,t − Φn′ .
If they remain invested only in one opportunity, it has to be (n,m): if they remained invested only
in (n′,m), then
Φn,t
n
= f ′(unn) ≤ Πt =
Φn′,t
n′
< f ′(un′n′),
which contradicts n > n′ and un = un′ . Since they are invested in (n,m) and not in (n
′,m),
Φn,t − Φn = n(Πt −Π) > n′(Πt −Π) ≥ n′
(
f ′(un′n′)−Π
)
= Φn′,t −Φn′ .
If they exit both opportunities, then
Φn,t − Φn = n
(
f ′(unn)−Π
)
> n′
(
f ′(un′n′)−Π
)
= Φn′,t − Φn′ .
In all three cases, Φn,t−Φn > Φn′,t−Φn′ . If opportunities (n,m) and (n
′,m) are traded in a period
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t+ s+ 1 for s = 0, ..,m − 2, then the inequality
Φn,t+s − Φn,t+s+1 ≥ Φn′,t+s − Φn′,t+s+1 (A.29)
follows from the previous arguments by replacing Π by Πt+s+1. If only one opportunity is traded
in period t+ s+ 1, it has to be (n,m) from the previous arguments. Eq. (A.29) then follows from
Φn,t+s > Φn,t+s+1, shown in the proof of Corollary 1, and Φn′,t+s = Φn′,t+s+1 = f
′(un′n′). If both
opportunities are not traded in period t + s + 1, then (A.29) follows from Φn,t+s = Φn,t+s+1 =
f ′(unn) and Φn′,t+s = Φn′,t+s+1 = f
′(un′n′). In all three cases, (A.29) holds.
We next show the properties of spreads. Using (A.28) and Φn > Φn′ , we ﬁnd φn,m > φn′,m.
Subtracting (31) from (A.28), and using Φn,t+s−Φn > Φn′,t+s−Φn′ for s = 0, ..,m−1 (which holds
for s > 0 by the same argument as for s = 0), we ﬁnd φn,m,t − φn,m > φn′,m,t − φn′,m. Subtracting
(31) written for (m− s− 1, t+ s+ 1) from the same equation written for (m− s, t+ s), and using
Φn,t+s′ −Φn,t+s′+1 ≥ Φn′,t+s′ −Φn′,t+s′+1 for s
′ = s, ..,m−1, we ﬁnd φn,m−s,t+s−φn,m−s−1,t+s+1 ≥
φn′,m−s,t+s − φn′,m−s−1,t+s+1 for s = 0, ..,m − 2.
We ﬁnally show the properties of positions. Since opportunities (n,m) and (n′,m) are traded
in steady state, and (μn, un) = (μn′ , un′), (A.22) implies that
xn = μnun − μn
(f ′)−1(Π)
n
> μn′un′ − μn′
(f ′)−1(Π)
n′
= xn′ .
If both opportunities are traded in period t, and hence in all periods until t+m− 1, then (A.22)
implies that
xn − xn,t =
μn
n
[
(f ′)−1(Πt)− (f
′)−1(Π)
]
<
μn′
n′
[
(f ′)−1(Πt)− (f
′)−1(Π)
]
= xn′ − xn′,t,
and
xn,t+s+1 − xn,t+s =
μn
n
[
(f ′)−1(Πt+s)− (f
′)−1(Πt+s+1)
]
<
μn′
n′
[
(f ′)−1(Πt+s)− (f
′)−1(Πt+s+1)
]
= xn′,t+s+1 − xn′,t+s
for s = 0, ..,m − 2. If only one opportunity is traded in period t, it has to be (n,m) as shown
previously.
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Proof of Corollary 3: Combining (A.28) and Φn > 0, we ﬁnd φn,m > φn,m′ . Combining (31),
(A.28) and Φn,t+s > Φn for s = 0, ..,m− 1, we ﬁnd φn,m,t−φn,m > φn,m′,t−φn,m′ . Combining (31)
written for (m− s, t+ s) and (m− s− 1, t+ s+ 1), and Φn,t+s′ > 0 for s
′ = m′, ..,m − 1, we ﬁnd
φn,m−s,t+s − φn,m−s−1,t+s+1 ≤ φn,m′−s,t+s − φn,m′−s−1,t+s+1 for s = 0, ..,m
′ − 2.
Proof of Corollary 4: The proof follows from the argument in the paragraph just before the
proposition.
Proof of Proposition 7: We ﬁrst compute the partial derivatives of Wt under integration. Dif-
ferentiating (32) with respect to ηnt, and using Mn = M for all n = 1, .., N , we ﬁnd
∂Wt
∂ηnt
=
2βMxnn
1 + 2β
∑
n′′∈N xn′′
∑M−1
m=1
∂φn′′,m,t
∂Wt
=
2βMμn
[
unn − (f
′)−1(Π)
]
1 + 2β
∑
n′′∈N μn′′
[
un′′ −
(f ′)−1(Π)
n′′
]∑M−1
m=1
∂φn′′,m,t
∂Wt
, (A.30)
where the second step follows by assuming n ∈ N and using (A.22). (For n ∈ N , ∂Wt
∂ηnt
= 0 because
xn = 0.) Using (31), we ﬁnd that for n
′ ∈ N ,
∂φn′,m,t
∂Wt
=
m−1∑
s=0
∂Φn′,t+s
∂Wt
1
(1 + r)s+1
= n′
m−1∑
s=0
∂Πt+s
∂Wt
1
(1 + r)s+1
= n′
m−1∑
s=0
∂Πt+s
∂Wt+s
∂Wt+s
∂Wt
1
(1 + r)s+1
= n′
m−1∑
s=0
∂Πt+s
∂Wt+s
(
s−1∏
s′=0
∂Wt+s′+1
∂Wt+s′
)
1
(1 + r)s+1
, (A.31)
where the second step follows from Proposition 3 and because opportunities that are traded in
steady state remain traded close to steady state. The partial derivatives in (A.30) and (A.31) are
evaluated at the steady state. Eq. (A.25), written for t+ s instead of t, implies that in steady state
∂Πt+s
∂Wt+s
= −
1
2M
1+r
∑
n′′∈N μn′′
[
un′′n′′ − (f ′)−1(Π) +
1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
] (A.32)
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for all s ≥ 0. Writing (27) for t+ s instead of t, and diﬀerentiating with respect to Wt+s, we ﬁnd
∂Wt+s+1
∂Wt+s
= β
1 + r
1−Πt
+ β
1 + r
(1−Πt)2
Wt+s
∂Πt+s
∂Wt+s
. (A.33)
Eq. (A.33) implies that in steady state
∂Wt+s+1
∂Wt+s
= β
1 + r
1−Π
+ β
1 + r
(1−Π)2
W
∂Πt+s
∂Wt+s
= 1 +
2M
1 + r
∑
n′′∈N
μn′′
[
un′′n′′ − (f
′)−1(Π)
] ∂Πt+s
∂Wt+s
= Z, (A.34)
where the second step follows from (29) and (30), and the third from (A.32) and by setting
Z ≡
∑
n′′∈N μn′′
1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]∑
n′′∈N μn′′
[
un′′n′′ − (f ′)−1(Π) +
1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
] .
Using (A.32) and (A.34), we can write (A.31) as
∂φn′,m,t
∂Wt
= −
n′
∑m−1
s=0
Zs
(1+r)s
2M
∑
n′′∈N μn′′
[
un′′n′′ − (f ′)−1(Π) +
1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
] , (A.35)
and (A.30) as
∂Wt
∂ηnt
=
2βMμn
[
unn − (f
′)−1(Π)
]
1−
β
∑
n′′∈N μn′′ [un′′ n′′−(f
′)−1(Π)]
∑M−1
m=1
∑m−1
s=0
Zs
(1+r)s
M
∑
n′′∈N μn′′
[
un′′ n′′−(f
′)−1(Π)+ 1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
]
. (A.36)
We next compute the partial derivatives ofWt under segmentation. Denoting byWnt the wealth
of arbitrageurs in segmented market n ∈ N , and diﬀerentiating their budget constraint with respect
to ηnt, we ﬁnd the following counterpart of (A.30):
∂Wnt
∂ηnt
=
2βMμn
[
unn − (f
′)−1(Π)
]
1 + 2βμn
[
un −
(f ′)−1(Π)
n
]∑M−1
m=1
∂φn,m,t
∂Wt
. (A.37)
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The counterparts of (A.35) and (A.36) are
∂φn,m,t
∂Wnt
= −
n
∑m−1
s=0
Zsn
(1+r)s
2Mμn
[
unn − (f ′)−1(Π) +
1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
] , (A.38)
∂Wnt
∂ηnt
=
2βMμn
[
unn − (f
′)−1(Π)
]
1−
β[unn−(f ′)−1(Π)]
∑M−1
m=1
∑m−1
s=0
Zsn
(1+r)s
M
[
unn−(f ′)−1(Π)+
1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
]
, (A.39)
respectively, where
Zn ≡
1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
unn − (f ′)−1(Π) +
1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
.
Since Wt =
∑
n′∈N and the shock ηnt does not aﬀect Wn′t for n
′ = n, ∂Wt
∂ηnt
is also given by (A.39).
When opportunities are symmetric, N = {1, .., N} and
Zn = Z =
1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
u− (f ′)−1(Π) + 1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
for all n = 1, .., N . In the case of segmentation, (A.39) implies that
∂Wnt
∂ηnt
=
∂Wt
∂ηnt
=
2βMμ
[
u− (f ′)−1(Π)
]
1−
β[u−(f ′)−1(Π)]
∑M−1
m=1
∑m−1
s=0
Zs
(1+r)s
M
[
u−(f ′)−1(Π)+ 1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
]
≡ DW . (A.40)
Therefore, (33) implies that the variance of the arbitrageurs’ total wealth is ND2WVar(η), and of
the wealth of arbitrageurs in market n is D2WVar(η). Eqs. (A.38) and (A.39) imply that
∂φn,m,t
∂ηnt
=
∂φn,m,t
∂Wnt
∂Wnt
∂ηnt
= −
β
[
u− (f ′)−1(Π)
]∑m−1
s=0
Zs
(1+r)s
u− (f ′)−1(Π) + 1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
−
β[u−(f ′)−1(Π)]
∑M−1
m=1
∑m−1
s=0
Zs
(1+r)s
M
≡ Dφ
m−1∑
s=0
Zs
(1 + r)s
.
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Since the shock ηnt does not aﬀect φn′,m,t for n
′ = n, its eﬀect on the aggregate spread φt ≡∑N
n′=1 xn′
∑M−1
m=1 φn′,m,t is
Dˆφ
M−1∑
m=1
m−1∑
s=0
Zs
(1 + r)s
,
where
Dˆφ ≡
μ

[
u− (f ′)−1(Π)
]
Dφ.
Therefore, the variance of the aggregate spread is NDˆ2φ
(∑M−1
m=1
∑m−1
s=0
Zs
(1+r)s
)2
Var(η), and of φn,m,t
is D2φ
(∑m−1
s=0
Zs
(1+r)s
)2
Var(η).
In the case of integration, (A.36) implies that ∂Wt
∂ηnt
= DW . This is the same as under segmen-
tation, and so is the variance of the arbitrageurs’ total wealth. Since Wnt is equal to
Wt
N
under
integration, its variance is 1
N
D2WVar(η), lower than under segmentation. Eqs. (A.35) and (A.36)
imply that
∂φn′,m,t
∂ηnt
=
∂φn′,m,t
∂Wt
∂Wt
∂ηnt
=
1
N
Dφ
m−1∑
s=0
Zs
(1 + r)s
.
Since this eﬀect is independent of n′, the eﬀect of ηnt on the aggregate spread φt is
Dˆφ
M−1∑
m=1
m−1∑
s=0
Zs
(1 + r)s
.
This is the same as under segmentation, and so is the variance of the aggregate spread. The variance
of φn,m,t is
1
N
D2φ
(∑m−1
s=0
Zs
(1+r)s
)2
Var(η), lower than under segmentation.
Before proving Proposition 8, we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Consider N positive scalars (a1, .., aN ) that are not all equal, and an increasing and
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diﬀerentiable function F (a). If the function a2F ′(a) is increasing, then
N∑
n=1
a2nF (an) >
(
N∑
n=1
a2n
)
F
(∑N
n=1 an
N
)
. (A.41)
Proof: Setting a ≡
∑N
n=1 an
N
, we can write the diﬀerence between the left- and right-hand side of
(A.41) as
N∑
n=1
a2n [F (an)− F (a)] =
N∑
n=1
a2n
∫ an
a
F ′(b)db
>
N∑
n=1
∫ an
a
b2F ′(b)db
>
N∑
n=1
∫ an
a
a2F ′(a)db
= a2F ′(a)
N∑
n=1
∫ an
a
db
= a2F ′(a)
N∑
n=1
(an − a) = 0,
where the second step follows because F (a) is increasing, and the third because a2F ′(a) is increasing.
Therefore, (A.41) holds.
Proof of Proposition 8: Eqs. (33) and (A.36) imply that the variance of the arbitrageurs’ total
wealth under integration is
∑
n∈N
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
2βMμn
[
unn − (f
′)−1(Π)
]
1−
β
∑
n′′∈N μn′′ [un′′ n′′−(f
′)−1(Π)]
∑M−1
m=1
∑m−1
s=0
Zs
(1+r)s
M
∑
n′′∈N μn′′
[
un′′ n′′−(f
′)−1(Π)+ 1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
]
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
2
Var(η). (A.42)
Likewise, (33) and (A.39) imply that the variance of the arbitrageurs’ total wealth under segmen-
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tation is
∑
n∈N
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
2βMμn
[
unn − (f
′)−1(Π)
]
1−
β[unn−(f ′)−1(Π)]
∑M−1
m=1
∑m−1
s=0
Zsn
(1+r)s
M
[
unn−(f ′)−1(Π)+
1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
]
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
2
Var(η). (A.43)
Eq. (A.42) and (A.43) imply that the variance under segmentation exceeds that under integration
if and only if
∑
n∈N
μ2na
2
nG(an)
2 >
(∑
n∈N
μ2na
2
n
)
G
(∑
n∈N μnan∑
n∈N μn
)2
, (A.44)
where
an ≡ unn − (f
′)−1(Π) > 0, (A.45)
G(a) ≡
1
1−H(a)
, (A.46)
H(a) ≡
βa
∑M−1
m=1
∑m−1
s=0
Z(a)s
(1+r)s
M
[
a+ 1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
] , (A.47)
Z(a) ≡
1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
a+ 1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
. (A.48)
When μn = μ for all n = 1, .., N , (A.44) becomes equivalent to (A.41). Hence, Lemma 2 implies
that (A.44) holds if F (a) ≡ G(a)2 and a2F ′(a) are increasing. Since
F ′(x) = 2G(a)G′(a) =
2H ′(a)
[1−H(a)]3
,
both properties will follow if we show that H(a) < 1 and that H(a) and a2H ′(a) are increasing.
(Note that H(a) < 1 ensures that small shocks have small eﬀects despite the ampliﬁcation, and
50
validates our linearization around the steady state.) We can write H(a) as
H(a) =
β [1− Z(a)]
M
M−1∑
m=1
m−1∑
s=0
Z(a)s
(1 + r)s
=
βH1(a)
M
M−1∑
m=1
[
1−
Z(a)m
(1 + r)m
]
(A.49)
= βH1(a)
⎡
⎣M − 1
M
−
Z(a)
1+r −
Z(a)M
(1+r)M
M
[
1− Z(a)1+r
]
⎤
⎦ , (A.50)
where
H1(a) ≡
1− Z(a)
1− Z(a)1+r
.
Since Z(a) ∈ (0, 1), H1(a) ∈ (0, 1), and (A.50) implies that H(a) < 1. Since, in addition, Z(a) is
decreasing and H1(a) is increasing, (A.49) implies that H(a) is increasing. Eq. (A.49) implies that
a2H ′(a) = −
a2βZ ′(a)
M(1 + r)
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
r[
1− Z(a)1+r
]2
M−1∑
m=1
[
1−
Z(a)m
(1 + r)m
]
+H1(a)
M−1∑
m=1
mZ(a)m−1
(1 + r)m−1
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
=
β [1− Z(a)]2
M(1 + r)
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
r[
1− Z(a)1+r
]2
M−1∑
m=1
[
1−
Z(a)m
(1 + r)m
]
+H1(a)
M−1∑
m=1
mZ(a)m−1
(1 + r)m−1
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
=
β [1− Z(a)]2
M(1 + r)
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
r[
1− Z(a)1+r
]2
M−1∑
m=1
[
1−
Z(a)m
(1 + r)m
]
+
H1(a)K[Z(a)][
1− Z(a)1+r
]2
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
=
βH1(a)
2
M(1 + r)
{
r
M−1∑
m=1
[
1−
Z(a)m
(1 + r)m
]
+H1(a)K[Z(a)]
}
, (A.51)
where
K(z) ≡ 1−
zM
(1 + r)M
−
MzM−1
(1 + r)M−1
(
1−
z
1 + r
)
=
(
1−
z
1 + r
)2 M−1∑
m=1
mzm−1
(1 + r)m−1
.
Since Z(a) ∈ (0, 1) is decreasing, H1(a) is increasing, and K(z) is decreasing, a
2H ′(a) is increasing.
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Therefore, if μn = μ for all n = 1, .., N , then the variance of the arbitrageurs’ total wealth under
segmentation exceeds that under integration. To construct an example where the reverse holds if
μn diﬀers across n, we assume that N = 2, β is high enough so that N = {1, 2}, and μ2 is close to
zero. Omitting terms in μ22 and smaller, we can write (A.44) as
μ21a
2
1G(a1)
2 > μ21a
2
1G
(
μ1a1 + μ2a2
μ1 + μ2
)2
⇔G(a1) > G
(
μ1a1 + μ2a2
μ1 + μ2
)
⇔a1 >
μ1a1 + μ2a2
μ1 + μ2
,
which is violated if a2 > a1.
We next determine the variance of the aggregate spread φt. Under integration,
∂φt
∂ηnt
=
∑
n′∈N
xn′
M−1∑
m=1
∂φn′,m,t
∂ηnt
=
∑
n′∈N
xn′
M−1∑
m=1
∂φn′,m,t
∂Wt
∂Wt
∂ηnt
= −
μn
[
unn − (f
′)−1(Π)
] β∑n′′∈N μn′′ [un′′ n′′−(f ′)−1(Π)]∑M−1m=1 ∑m−1s=0 Zs(1+r)s∑
n′′∈N μn′′
[
un′′ n′′−(f
′)−1(Π)+ 1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
]
1−
β
∑
n′′∈N μn′′ [un′′ n′′−(f
′)−1(Π)]
∑M−1
m=1
∑m−1
s=0
Zs
(1+r)s
M
∑
n′′∈N μn′′
[
un′′ n′′−(f
′)−1(Π)+ 1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
]
, (A.52)
where the last step follows from (A.22), (A.35) and (A.36). Under segmentation, the shock ηnt
does not aﬀect φn′,m,t for n
′ = n. Therefore,
∂φt
∂ηnt
= xn
M−1∑
m=1
∂φn,m,t
∂ηnt
= xn
M−1∑
m=1
∂φn,m,t
∂Wnt
∂Wnt
∂ηnt
= −
μn
[
unn − (f
′)−1(Π)
] β[unn−(f ′)−1(Π)]∑M−1m=1 ∑m−1s=0 Zsn(1+r)s
unn−(f ′)−1(Π)+
1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
1−
β[unn−(f ′)−1(Π)]
∑M−1
m=1
∑m−1
s=0
Zsn
(1+r)s
M
[
unn−(f ′)−1(Π)+
1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
]
, (A.53)
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where the last step follows from (A.22), (A.38) and (A.39). Eqs. (A.52) and (A.53) imply that the
variance of the aggregate spread under segmentation exceeds that under integration if and only if
(A.44) holds with
G(a) ≡
H(a)
1−H(a)
(A.54)
and an, H(a) and Z(a) deﬁned by (A.45), (A.47) and (A.48), respectively. Since the derivative of
F (a) ≡ G(a)2 is
F ′(a) = 2G(a)G′(a) =
2H(a)H ′(a)
[1−H(a)]3
,
and H(a) and a2H ′(a) are increasing, F (a) and a2F ′(a) are also increasing. Therefore, Lemma
2 implies that if μn = μ for all n = 1, .., N , then the variance of the aggregate spread under
segmentation exceeds that under integration. The example constructed earlier in the proof implies
that the reverse can hold if μn diﬀers across n.
We ﬁnally determine the variance of individual spreads. Eqs. (A.35) and (A.36) imply that
under integration,
∂φn,m,t
∂ηn′t
=
∂φn,m,t
∂Wt
∂Wt
∂ηn′t
= −
βμn′ [un′ n′−(f ′)−1(Π)]
∑m−1
s=0
Zs
(1+r)s∑
n′′∈N μn′′
[
un′′ n′′−(f
′)−1(Π)+ 1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
]
1−
β
∑
n′′∈N μn′′ [un′′ n′′−(f
′)−1(Π)]
∑M−1
m=1
∑m−1
s=0
Zs
(1+r)s
M
∑
n′′∈N μn′′
[
un′′ n′′−(f
′)−1(Π)+ 1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
]
,
and hence
Var
(
M−1∑
m=1
φn,m,t
)
=
N∑
n′=1
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
βμn′ [un′ n′−(f ′)−1(Π)]
∑M−1
m=1
∑m−1
s=0
Zs
(1+r)s∑
n′′∈N μn′′
[
un′′ n′′−(f
′)−1(Π)+ 1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
]
1−
β
∑
n′′∈N μn′′ [un′′ n′′−(f
′)−1(Π)]
∑M−1
m=1
∑m−1
s=0
Zs
(1+r)s
M
∑
n′′∈N μn′′
[
un′′ n′′−(f
′)−1(Π)+ 1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
]
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
2
Var(η). (A.55)
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Eqs. (A.38) and (A.39) imply that under segmentation,
∂φn,m,t
∂ηnt
=
∂φn,m,t
∂Wnt
∂Wnt
∂ηnt
= −
β[unn−(f ′)−1(Π)]
∑m−1
s=0
Zsn
(1+r)s
unn−(f ′)−1(Π)+
1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
1−
β[unn−(f ′)−1(Π)]
∑M−1
m=1
∑m−1
s=0
Zsn
(1+r)s
M
[
unn−(f ′)−1(Π)+
1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
]
.
Since, in addition, the shock ηn′t does not aﬀect φn,m,t for n
′ = n,
Var
(
M−1∑
m=1
φn,m,t
)
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
β[unn−(f ′)−1(Π)]
∑M−1
m=1
∑m−1
s=0
Zsn
(1+r)s
unn−(f ′)−1(Π)+
1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
1−
β[unn−(f ′)−1(Π)]
∑M−1
m=1
∑m−1
s=0
Zsn
(1+r)s
M
[
unn−(f ′)−1(Π)+
1−Π
f ′′[(f ′)−1(Π)]
]
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
2
Var(η). (A.56)
Eqs. (A.55) and (A.56) imply that the variance of
∑M−1
m=1 φn,m,t under segmentation exceeds that
under integration if and only if
G(an)
2 >
∑
n′∈N μ
2
n′a
2
n′(∑
n′∈N μn′an′
)2G
(∑
n′∈N μn′an′∑
n′∈N μn′
)2
, (A.57)
where an, G(a), H(a) and Z(a) are deﬁned by (A.45), (A.54), (A.47) and (A.48), respectively.
Since G(a) is increasing and
∑
n′∈N μ
2
n′
a2
n′
(
∑
n′∈N μn′an′)
2 < 1, (A.57) holds for the n that maximizes an. On the
other hand, (A.57) fails to hold if an is close to zero and an′ is not for n
′ = n. The comparisons of
the variance of
∑M−1
m=1 φn,m,t under integration and segmentation extend to the variance of φn,m,t
for at least one m. This is because φn,m,t are perfectly correlated for m = 1, ..,M − 1, under both
integration and segmentation.
B General Contracts
B.1 Contracts and Equilibrium
A contract ω that arbitrageurs can trade with i-investors in period t is characterized by (i) payments
πω,t′ that the seller of the contract must make to the buyer in periods t
′ > t, (ii) a price qω,t that
the seller of the contract receives from the buyer in period t, and (iii) collateral that the seller of
the contract must post with the buyer. The payments πω,t′ can depend on information available in
54
all markets including market i. We assume that payments are non-negative and are not all equal
to zero. No-arbitrage then implies that the price qω,t must be positive. Collateral must be in the
form of cash or other contracts. A contract ω can be traded in any period t ∈ {tω, .., tω − 1}, where
tω occurs before the ﬁrst positive payment and tω is when the last positive payment is made. The
period tω can be inﬁnite, and if it is ﬁnite we set qω,tω = 0. We denote by Ωi,t the set of contracts
that can be traded in market i and period t.
To specify how contracts can be collateralized using other contracts, we deﬁne contracts recur-
sively. Contracts of level 1 are collateralized by the riskless asset. Contracts of level n + 1 are
collateralized by the riskless asset and by a ﬁnite number of contracts of levels 1 up to n. For
a contract ω ∈ Ωi,t and period t, we denote by ψω,t ≥ 0 the units of the riskless asset and by
ψω,ω′,t ≥ 0 the units of a lower-level contract ω
′ ∈ Ωi,t that are required as collateral. We also
denote by (ω, t) the level of the contract. The collateral amounts ψω,t and ψω,ω′,t and the level
(ω, t) can depend on information available in all markets including market i.
We denote by yω,t the position of i-investors and xω,t the position of arbitrageurs in a contract
ω ∈ Ωi,t and period t. Because the number of contracts is inﬁnite, there is an inﬁnite set of positions.
We assume that only a ﬁnite number of the positions are non-zero.
The collateral that short positions require must be covered by long positions. Suppose, for
example, that arbitrageurs have a short position in a contract ω ∈ Ωi,t, which requires contract
ω′ ∈ Ωi,t as collateral. This does not necessarily imply that arbitrageurs must have an overall long
position in contract ω′: they must buy contract ω′ to post as collateral for the short position in
contract ω, but they could undertake an additional transaction in contract ω′ to establish an overall
short position in that contract. We decompose the position xω′,t in contract ω
′ into
xω′,t = x
c
ω′,t + xˆω′,t,
where xcω′,t ≥ 0 is collateral set aside for short positions in higher-level contracts ω ∈ Ωi,t, and xˆω′,t
is the remainder of the position, which can be negative. The collateral xcω′,t must satisfy
xcω′,t =
∑
ω∈Ωi,t
(ω,t)>(ω′,t) and xˆω,t<0
(−xˆω,t)ψω,ω′,t. (B.1)
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The collateral vi,t in the riskless asset required for contracts in market i must likewise satisfy
vi,t =
∑
ω∈Ωi,t
xˆω,t<0
(−xˆω,t)ψω,t. (B.2)
The wealth that arbitrageurs “tie up” in market i is
∑
ω∈Ωi,t
xω,tqω,t + vi,t, the value of their
positions in the contracts traded in market i and of the riskless collateral. The ﬁnancial constraint of
arbitrageurs requires that the sum of that quantity across markets does not exceed the arbitrageurs’
total wealth Wt:
Wt ≥
∑
i∈I
⎛
⎝ ∑
ω∈Ωi,t
xω,tqω,t + vi,t
⎞
⎠ . (B.3)
As in Section 2.3.2, we assume that i-investors have enough wealth so that their ﬁnancial constraint
is never binding.
Investors and arbitrageurs can default on their short positions in the contracts. Defaulting
on a unit short position in a contract ω ∈ Ωi,t in period t + 1 raises the wealth of an agent by
πω,t+1 + qω,t+1 since the agent does not make the payment πω,t+1 and no longer has the liability
qω,t+1. At the same time, the agent loses the collateral associated to the position. Default is costlier
to the agent than no default if
πω,t+1 + qω,t+1 ≤ (1 + r)ψω,t +
∑
ω′∈Ωi,t
(ω,t)>(ω′,t)
ψω,ω′,t(πω′,t+1 + qω′,t+1), (B.4)
i.e., the amount saved by not making the payment is smaller than the value of the collateral seized.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that there is no default. This is because we can replace a
contract ω that involves default by one with the same collateral and with required payments equal
to the actual payments (including the eﬀects of default) under ω.
Under no default, the budget constraint of an i-investor is
wi,t+1 =
∑
ω∈Ωi,t
yω,t(πω,t+1 + qω,t+1) + (1 + r)
⎛
⎝wi,t − ∑
ω∈Ωi,t
yω,tqω,t
⎞
⎠+ ui,ti,t+1 − ci,t+1, (B.5)
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and of an arbitrageur is
Wt+1 =
∑
i∈I
∑
ω∈Ωi,t
xω,t(πω,t+1 + qω,t+1) + (1 + r)
⎛
⎝Wt −∑
i∈I
∑
ω∈Ωi,t
xω,tqω,t
⎞
⎠− ct+1. (B.6)
Eqs. (B.5) and (B.6) are counterparts of (13) and (17), with the positions in the contracts replacing
those in the risky assets.
Deﬁnition 3. A competitive equilibrium with no default consists of prices qω,t for all contracts
ω ∈ Ωi,t, and positions in the contracts yω,t for the i-investors and xω,t for the arbitrageurs, such
that (B.4) holds, positions are optimal given prices, and the markets for all contracts clear:
μiyω,t + xω,t = 0. (B.7)
B.2 Binomial Payoﬀs
We next assume that the variables i,t have a binomial distribution. Given symmetry, this amounts
to assuming that the variables
i,t
i
take the values 1 and -1 with probabilities one-half.
Proposition B.1. There exists a competitive equilibrium with no default such that the dynamics
of wealth of i-investors and arbitrageurs are as in Section 3.4 and the prices qω,t of all contracts
ω ∈ Ωi,t are given by
qω,t =
exp(−Zi,t)Et (πω,t+1 + qω,t+1|i,t+1 = i) + exp(Zi,t)Et (πω,t+1 + qω,t+1|i,t+1 = −i)
(1 + r) [exp(−Zi,t) + exp(Zi,t)]
, (B.8)
where
Zi,t ≡
αA
α+A
(yi,t + ui,t)i
and yi,t is as in Section 3.4.
Proof of Proposition B.1: We ﬁrst study optimization by i-investors. We proceed as in the
proof of Proposition 1, conjecture the value function (14) with A = rα and Fi,t given by (A.9), and
use the budget constraint (B.5) instead of (13). Optimal consumption is given by
ci,t+1 =
A
[
(1 + r)wi,t +
∑
ω∈Ωi,t
yω,t [πω,t+1 + qω,t+1 − (1 + r)qω,t] + ui,ti,t+1
]
+ Fi,t+1 + log
(
α
A
)
α+A
,
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(B.9)
which is the counterpart of (A.4). Optimal positions in the contracts solve
max
yω,t
Et
⎧⎨
⎩− exp
⎛
⎝− αA
α+A
⎡
⎣(1 + r)wi,t + ∑
ω∈Ωi,t
yω,t [πω,t+1 + qω,t+1 − (1 + r)qω,t] + ui,ti,t+1
⎤
⎦
⎞
⎠
⎫⎬
⎭ ,
(B.10)
which is the counterpart of (A.5) after omitting terms that are known in period t. The ﬁrst-order
condition with respect to yω,t is
Et
⎧⎨
⎩[πω,t+1 + qω,t+1 − (1 + r)qω,t]
× exp
⎛
⎝− αA
α+A
⎡
⎣ ∑
ω∈Ωi,t
yω,t [πω,t+1 + qω,t+1 − (1 + r)qω,t] + ui,ti,t+1
⎤
⎦
⎞
⎠
⎫⎬
⎭ = 0. (B.11)
Eq. (B.8) that characterizes equilibrium prices can be written as
Et
{
[πω,t+1 + qω,t+1 − (1 + r)qω,t] exp
(
−
αA
α+A
(yi,t + ui,t)i,t+1
)}
= 0. (B.12)
Eqs. (B.11) and (B.12) imply that if positions in the contracts satisfy
∑
ω∈Ωi,t
yω,t [πω,t+1 + qω,t+1 − (1 + r)qω,t] = yi,ti,t+1 + Gt, (B.13)
where Gt is known in period t, then they are optimal because the ﬁrst-order condition (B.11) is
met. Positions satisfying (B.13) are not unique, and we present one implementation at the end of
this proof. Eq. (B.13) implies that the dynamics of wealth of i-investors are the same as in Section
3.4. Indeed, multiplying (B.12) by yω,t and summing across ω ∈ Ωi,t, we ﬁnd
Et
⎧⎨
⎩
∑
ω∈Ωi,t
yω,t [πω,t+1 + qω,t+1 − (1 + r)qω,t] exp
(
−
αA
α+A
(yi,t + ui,t)i,t+1
)⎫⎬
⎭ = 0. (B.14)
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Moreover, the maximization in (A.5) implies that
Et
{
yi,t (Φi,t + i,t+1) exp
(
−
αA
α+A
(yi,t + ui,t)i,t+1
)}
= 0. (B.15)
Substituting
∑
ω∈Ωi,t
yω,t [πω,t+1 + qω,t+1 − (1 + r)qω,t] from (B.13) into (B.14), and comparing with
(B.15), we ﬁnd Gt = Φi,t. Substituting Gt = Φi,t into (B.13), we ﬁnd that budget constraint (B.5)
of i-investors becomes identical to the budget constraint (13) in Section 3.4. Since the dynamics of
the wealth of i-investors are the same as in Section 3.4, the conjectured value function (14) satisﬁes
the Bellman equation.
We next study optimization by arbitrageurs. We proceed in two steps: in Step 1 we show that
the dynamics of arbitrageur wealth are deterministic, and in Step 2 that they are as in Section 3.4.
Step 1: To show deterministic dynamics, we show that if arbitrageurs choose in period t a
portfolio of contracts whose aggregate payoﬀ in period t + 1 is risky, then there exists another
portfolio that is riskless and has a return that is at least as high as the expected return of the
risky portfolio. We construct a “dominant” riskless portfolio for each market i separately, and then
aggregate across markets. From the budget constraint (B.6), the (excess) return that arbitrageurs
earn on their portfolio of contracts in market i is
∑
ω∈Ωi,t
xω,t [πω,t+1 + qω,t+1 − (1 + r)qω,t] . (B.16)
Consider ﬁrst a market i without an endowment shock, i.e., ui,t = 0. Since Zi,t = 0, (B.8)
implies that
qω,t =
Et (πω,t+1 + qω,t+1|i,t+1 = i) + Et (πω,t+1 + qω,t+1|i,t+1 = −i)
2(1 + r)
=
Et (πω,t+1 + qω,t+1)
1 + r
,
and hence the expected return in (B.16) is zero. A dominant riskless portfolio is one with zero
positions.
Consider next a market i with an endowment shock. If the expected return in (B.16) is non-
positive, then a dominant riskless portfolio is one with zero positions. If the expected return in
(B.16) is positive, then we will construct a dominant riskless portfolio that involves positions in
markets i and −i. As an intermediate step in this construction, we show that the original risky
portfolio has the same expected return and ties up the same amount of arbitrageur wealth as a unit
long position in a single contract ωˆi that is traded in market i and has binary payoﬀs. The payoﬀs
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of ωˆi are
Et
⎡
⎣ ∑
ω∈Ωi,t
xω,t (πω,t+1 + qω,t+1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ i,t+1 = i
⎤
⎦+ (1 + r)vi,t ≡ Qi,t+1 + (1 + r)vi,t,
Et
⎡
⎣ ∑
ω∈Ωi,t
xω,t (πω,t+1 + qω,t+1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ i,t+1 = −i
⎤
⎦+ (1 + r)vi,t ≡ Qi,t+1 + (1 + r)vi,t,
in period t+ 1 and states i,t+1 = i and i,t+1 = −i, respectively, and zero afterwards. The price
of ωˆi in period t is
exp(−Zi,t)
[
Qi,t+1 + (1 + r)vi,t
]
+ exp(Zi,t)
[
Q
i,t+1
+ (1 + r)vi,t
]
(1 + r) [exp(−Zi,t) + exp(Zi,t)]
=
∑
ω∈Ωi,t
xω,t
exp(−Zi,t)Et (πω,t+1 + qω,t+1|i,t+1 = i) + exp(Zi,t)Et (πω,t+1 + qω,t+1|i,t+1 = −i)
(1 + r) [exp(−Zi,t) + exp(Zi,t)]
+ vi,t
=
∑
ω∈Ωi,t
xω,tqω,t + vi,t
≡ Qi,t + vi,t,
where the ﬁrst step follows from (B.8), the second by using the deﬁnitions of (Qi,t+1, Qi,t+1) and
rearranging terms, and the third from (B.8). Therefore, the wealth Qi,t + vi,t that arbitrageurs tie
up in market i is the same as under the original risky portfolio. The expected return from buying
ωˆi is
1
2
[
Qi,t+1 + (1 + r)vi,t
]
+
1
2
[
Q
i,t+1
+ (1 + r)vi,t
]
− (1 + r) (Qi,t + vi,t)
=
1
2
(
Qi,t+1 +Qi,t+1
)
− (1 + r)Qi,t
=
∑
ω∈Ωi,t
xω,t
[
1
2
[Et (πω,t+1 + qω,t+1|i,t+1 = i) + Et (πω,t+1 + qω,t+1|i,t+1 = −i)]− (1 + r)qω,t
]
=
∑
ω∈Ωi,t
xω,tEt [πω,t+1 + qω,t+1 − (1 + r)qω,t] ,
where the third step follows from the deﬁnitions of (Qi,t, Qi,t+1, Qi,t+1). The expected return from
buying ωˆi is thus the same as under the original risky portfolio. To complete the analysis of ωˆi, we
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must show that it is a proper contract in the sense that its payoﬀs are non-negative. Multiplying
(B.4) by −xˆω,t for those ω ∈ Ωi,t for which xˆω,t < 0, and summing across ω, we ﬁnd
∑
ω∈Ωi,t
xˆω,t<0
(−xˆω,t)(πω,t+1 + qω,t+1)
≤ (1 + r)
∑
ω∈Ωi,t
xˆω,t<0
(−xˆω,t)ψω,t +
∑
ω∈Ωi,t
xˆω,t<0
∑
ω′∈Ωi,t
(ω,t)>(ω′,t)
(−xˆω,t)ψω,ω′,t(πω′,t+1 + qω′,t+1)
= (1 + r)vi,t +
∑
ω′∈Ωi,t
∑
ω∈Ωi,t
(ω,t)>(ω′,t) and xˆω,t<0
(−xˆω,t)ψω,ω′,t(πω′,t+1 + qω′,t+1)
= (1 + r)vi,t +
∑
ω′∈Ωi,t
xcω′,t(πω′,t+1 + qω′,t+1), (B.17)
where the second step follows from (B.1) and the third from (B.2). Eq. (B.17) implies that
∑
ω∈Ωi,t
(−xˆω,t)(πω,t+1 + qω,t+1) ≤ (1 + r)vi,t +
∑
ω∈Ωi,t
xcω,t(πω,t+1 + qω,t+1)
⇒ (1 + r)vi,t +
∑
ω∈Ωi,t
xω,t(πω,t+1 + qω,t+1) ≥ 0. (B.18)
Taking expectations in (B.18) conditional on i,t+1 = i and i,t+1 = −i, we ﬁnd that Qi,t+1+(1+
r)vi,t and Qi,t+1 + (1 + r)vi,t, respectively, are non-negative.
We next combine the unit long position in the contract ωˆi with a unit short position in a contract
ωˆ−i that is traded in market −i, has the same payoﬀs as ωˆi, and is collateralized with v−i,t units
of the riskless asset. The price of ωˆ−i in period t is
exp(−Z−i,t)
[
Qi,t+1 + (1 + r)vi,t
]
+ exp(Z−i,t)
[
Q
i,t+1
+ (1 + r)vi,t
]
(1 + r) [exp(−Z−i,t) + exp(Z−i,t)]
=
exp(Zi,t)Qi,t+1 + exp(−Zi,t)Qi,t+1
(1 + r) [exp(Zi,t) + exp(Zi,t)]
+ vi,t
=
Qi,t+1 +Qi,t+1
1 + r
−Qi,t + vi,t
≡ Q−i,t + vi,t, (B.19)
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where the ﬁrst step follows from (B.8), the second because Z−i,t = −Zi,t, and the third from the
deﬁnition of Qi,t. The wealth that arbitrageurs tie up in market −i is
−(Q−i,t + vi,t) + v−i,t
and is equal to the wealth that they tie up in market i if
v−i,t = Qi,t +Q−i,t + 2vi,t. (B.20)
The expected return from shorting ωˆ−i is
−
1
2
[
Qi,t+1 + (1 + r)vi,t
]
−
1
2
[
Q
i,t+1
+ (1 + r)vi,t
]
+ (1 + r) (Q−i,t + vi,t)
= −
1
2
(
Qi,t+1 +Qi,t+1
)
+ (1 + r)Q−i,t
=
1
2
(
Qi,t+1 +Qi,t+1
)
− (1 + r)Qi,t,
where the third step follows from the deﬁnition of Q−i,t. Therefore, the expected return of the
short position in ωˆ−i is the same as that of the long position in ωˆi. To complete the analysis of
ωˆ−i, we must show that arbitrageurs do not default on their short position. Eq. (B.4) implies that
default does not occur if
max{Qi,t+1, Qi,t+1}+ (1 + r)vi,t ≤ (1 + r)v−i,t
⇔ max{Qi,t+1, Qi,t+1} ≤ (1 + r) (Qi,t +Q−i,t + vi,t)
⇔ max{Qi,t+1, Qi,t+1} ≤ Qi,t+1 +Qi,t+1 + (1 + r)vt, (B.21)
where the second step follows from (B.20) and the third from the deﬁnition of Q−i,t. Eq. (B.21)
holds because the payoﬀs Qi,t+1 + (1 + r)vi,t and Qi,t+1 + (1 + r)vi,t of ωˆi are non-negative.
The riskless portfolio that dominates the original risky portfolio in market i consists of a half-
unit long position in ωˆi and a half-unit short position in ωˆ−i. Since a unit long position in ωˆi and
a unit short position in ωˆ−i each has the same expected return as the original risky portfolio, the
combination of two half-unit positions also has the same expected return. The same applies to the
amount of arbitrageur wealth that is tied up: it is the same under the combination of two half-unit
positions as under the original risky portfolio. Therefore, the arbitrageurs’ ﬁnancial constraint is
still met. Finally, the portfolio is riskless because ωˆi and ωˆ−i have the same payoﬀs.
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Step 2: From Step 1, we can assume that the portfolio of arbitrageurs in period t is as follows:
(i) in each market i with ui,t > 0, arbitrageurs hold a long position in a contract with one-period
payoﬀs, (ii) in each market −i with ui,t < 0, arbitrageurs hold a short position of the same size as in
market i and in a contract with the same payoﬀs, (iii) the payoﬀs of the contracts in markets i and
−i are binary and contingent on i,t+1, (iv) the short position in market −i is collateralized with
an investment in the riskless asset such that the arbitrageur wealth tied up in market −i equals
that in market i, (v) in each market i with ui,t = 0, arbitrageurs hold a zero position.
Since the long position in the contract traded in each market i with ui,t > 0 must have positive
expected return, (B.8) implies that the contract must have larger payoﬀ when i,t+1 = i than when
i,t+1 = −i. Moreover, we can take the payoﬀ when i,t+1 = −i to be zero since the contract
price would then be lower, and hence arbitrageurs would be able to tie up less wealth in their long
position in market i. We normalize the payoﬀ when i,t+1 = i to 2i, and denote by ω
′
i the contract
in market i and by ω′−i the contract in market −i. We also denote by xi,t the number of units of
the long position in ω′i and of the short position in ω
′
−i, by qi,t the price of ω
′
i, and by q−i,t the price
of ω′−i.
The budget constraint (B.6) of arbitrageurs can be written as
Wt+1 = (1 + r)Wt + (1 + r)
∑
i∈At
xi,t(q−i,t − qi,t)− ct+1
= (1 + r)Wt + 2
∑
i∈At
xi,t [i − (1 + r)qi,t]− ct+1, (B.22)
where the second step follows because the same calculations as in (B.19) imply that
q−i,t =
2i
1 + r
− qi,t.
Since arbitrageurs must tie up wealth xi,tqi,t in each of markets i and −i, their ﬁnancial constraint
(B.3) becomes
Wt ≥ 2
∑
i∈At
xi,tqi,t. (B.23)
Eqs. (B.22) and (B.3) become identical to (20) and (26), respectively, by setting
Φi,t ≡ i − (1 + r)qi,t.
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Because of this equivalence, if the dynamics of Φi,t are as in Section 3.4, then arbitrageurs’ optimal
positions xi,t and the dynamics of their wealth are also as in that section. Using (B.8) to substitute
for qi,t, we ﬁnd
Φi,t = i −
2 exp(−Zi,t)i
exp(−Zi,t) + exp(Zi,t)
= i
exp(Zi,t)− exp(−Zi,t)
exp(−Zi,t) + exp(Zi,t)
.
This coincides with Φi,t given by (15) when i,t+1 has a binomial distribution. Therefore, ar-
bitrageurs’ optimal positions xi,t and the dynamics of their wealth are the same as in Section
3.4. Eq. (B.13) implies that the optimal positions of i-investors are yi,t, as in Section 3.4. Since
μiyi,t + xi,t = 0, markets clear.
An alternative implementation of the equilibrium derived in Proposition B.1 is through the
contracts assumed in Section 2. Two contracts are traded in market i. The ﬁrst is asset i, with
short positions in that contract being collateralized by the riskless asset. The second is a contract
with a riskless payoﬀ, with short positions in that contract being collateralized by asset i. The
ﬁrst contract is level 1, and the second is level 2. The collateral for each contract is the minimum
required so that the no-default condition (B.4) is met. A short position of arbitrageurs in the ﬁrst
contract, combined with the required collateral, yields zero if t+1 = i and 2i if t+1 = −i. A
short position of arbitrageurs in the second contract, combined with the required collateral, yields
2i if t+1 = i and zero if t+1 = −i. The former is equivalent to the short position in ω
′
−i, and
the latter is equivalent to the long position in ω′i.
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